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I.  CONTEXT OF STUDY 
FOCUS: HOPE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 Focus: HOPE, a Detroit-based civil and human rights organization committed to 
“intelligent and practical action to overcome racism, poverty and injustice,” was founded in 1968 
by Fr. William T. Cunningham (1930–1997) and Ms. Eleanor M. Josaitis.1  The 1967 riot left 
metropolitan Detroit sharply divided along racial lines.  It was in this atmosphere that the Focus: 
HOPE cofounders felt compelled to make a difference.  
 In 1968, in response to a study by the Detroit Free Press and the Urban League, Focus: 
HOPE organized a search for evidence of widespread discrimination in food and prescription 
drug prices, enlisting a group of professionals from local universities, corporations, city 
departments, and major organizations. The Focus: HOPE study revealed that inner-city residents, 
principally black and poor, were paying much more for food and prescription drugs than their 
suburban neighbors.  
 In 1971, after gathering scientific evidence of the effects of hunger and malnutrition on 
the critical early development of infants, Focus: HOPE designed a supplemental food program 
for children up to age six, and for pregnant and postpartum women. The program, later expanded 
to senior citizens, was the first and remains one of the largest Commodity Supplemental Food 
Programs in the country, with food provided through the U.S. Department of Agriculture to 
43,000 women, children, and senior citizens each month in the Detroit metropolitan area.  
 Focus: HOPE’s long-term objective is to eliminate the need for supplemental food 
programs by providing opportunities for all people to enter the economic mainstream. This 
objective led to the development of its highly respected education and training programs. In 
1981, the organization opened its Machinist Training Institute (MTI) to provide skills 
development in precision machining and metalworking. More than 2,740 machinists have 
graduated from the program. 
 In 1989, Focus: HOPE developed a FAST TRACK program, and in 1997 the First Step 
program, to help students improve their reading and math skills in order to qualify for the Focus: 
HOPE training programs. Students can improve their skills by as much as two grade levels in the 
intensive four- and seven-week programs. More than 5,800 individuals have graduated from 
these programs, moving up to the MTI, the Information Technologies Center, or into the job 
market.  
 In 1993, a growing shortage of manufacturing engineers with hands-on skills—combined 
with a historical lack of access to engineering education among minorities—led Focus: HOPE to 
develop the Center for Advanced Technologies and to form a coalition of universities and 
                                                 
1 This introductory material came largely from the Focus: HOPE web site, www.focushope.edu, accessed 
on July 7, 2005. 
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corporations to design a twenty-first century curriculum for manufacturing engineering 
education. Students can earn associate’s and bachelor’s degrees through three of the university 
partners: Lawrence Technological University, Wayne State University, and University of Detroit 
Mercy. The program has graduated more than 100 students. 
 In 1999, the Information Technologies Center (ITC) was created to provide industry-
certified training in network administration and desktop & server administration. The center 
provides training and education in the information technology area in collaboration with industry 
partners, including Cisco, Microsoft, and the Computer Technology Industry Association. More 
than 570 students have graduated from the ITC program.  
EVALUATION STUDY 
This report documents an evaluation study of the adult training programs provided by 
Focus: HOPE.  Essentially two major strands of research comprise the study.  The first strand is 
a study of the student loan fund that is used as a financing mechanism for students who enroll in 
the Machinist Training Institute (MTI) or Information Technologies Center (ITC).  The second 
strand is a net impact evaluation of the training provided by these two entities.2  This chapter of 
the report lays out the hypotheses that are being tested by each substudy.   
Loan Fund 
The training that students receive at Focus: HOPE, whether from MTI or ITC, has great 
value.  In its initial years, the Machinist Training Institute provided instruction to students at no 
charge.  Focus: HOPE was bearing the cost of providing the training through donations, grants, 
and proceeds from its manufacturing business.  During the 1997–98 academic year, Focus: 
HOPE instituted tuition charges for its training and established a revolving loan fund to facilitate 
students’ abilities to pay.3  (Many students have been eligible for government grants-in-aid over 
the ensuing years, which defray a significant share of the costs.)  Of course, student loans for 
postsecondary education or training are not a new idea.  But this sort of financial arrangement is 
unique for training targeted on disadvantaged populations. 
 
The loan fund has been a daunting enterprise.  Loan repayment rates have been modest 
and default rates have not.  Two characteristics about the loans may go a long way in explaining 
why the loan fund has been such a struggle: 1) the loans are unsecured, and 2) the loans are, by 
design, held by economically disadvantaged individuals.  To inform our analyses and to help us 
provide useful advice to Focus: HOPE on how to improve the loan fund’s performance, we 
reviewed literature on unsecured loans made for educational or other purposes. 
                                                 
2 Note that this study does not evaluate the Center for Advanced Technologies. 
3 A number of loan fund statistics, by year, are presented in this report.  In analyzing these, it should be 
borne in mind that the initial year was just a partial year since the loan fund was implemented midyear. 
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 Literature on student loans   
 Several studies (Dynarski 1994; Volkwein and Szelest 1995; Gladieux and Hauptman 
1995; Flint 1997; Volkwein et al. 1998; Monteverde 2000; Christman 2000; Woo 2002; Steiner 
and Teszler 2003; Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corporation 2003) have estimated 
econometrically loan repayment behavior.  That is, in these studies, the author(s) had individual-
level data and attempted to estimate statistically models of who repaid (or defaulted).  A 
consistent finding throughout this literature is that individual characteristics are much more 
important in explaining default behavior than are institutional characteristics.  In other words, if 
one institution has a higher default rate than another, it is most likely because of the 
characteristics of the students—not the policies or practices of the institution.  This rather 
common sense finding confirms one’s intuition about Focus: HOPE:  the loan default rates are 
far more likely to be a result of the disadvantaged, economic circumstances, and cultural norms 
of the students served than because of particular policies or practices instituted by Focus: HOPE. 
 
 What are the individual-level characteristics associated with default?  The literature 
suggests that they fit into three categories: preloan characteristics, program performance, and 
postprogram circumstances.  Most of the literature focuses on postprogram circumstances 
because it takes time for a default to occur, and by that time, the data collector or researcher has 
observed the individuals’ characteristics.  This may be best analytically, but from the point of 
view that we want to predict default/repayment, it is of lesser value.  The postprogram 
characteristics that are correlated with defaults are low family income, filing for unemployment 
benefits, being a single parent, low wages/earnings, having dependent children, and age.  The 
latter factor (being older increases the probability of default) was the only surprise among the 
group.  And, in fact, it contradicts anecdotal evidence from the Focus: HOPE loan staff.  The 
explanation given in the literature is that older students have weakened ties to their families and 
therefore are less likely to be able to tap into family resources for repayment purposes. 
 
 Many studies indicated that students’ poor effort and poor performance while in their 
educational programs are strong indicators of default.  In particular, the following variables are 
predictive of default:  noncompletion of program or degree, number of courses failed, low GPA, 
and low attendance.  An idea that came out of the literature that may be exportable to Focus: 
HOPE is provision of extra counseling when certain (negative) thresholds are reached.  For 
example, if grades or attendance dropped below some level, then students would have to 
participate in mandatory budgeting or credit counseling.  Christman (2000) was the only study 
reviewed that had qualitative evidence.  She interviewed students in and not in default to ask for 
their perceptions about why students default on their loans.  The key determinants were bad 
attitude, ignorance about repayment terms and conditions, dissatisfaction with the institution, and 
misperceptions of the consequences of defaulting. 
 
 A number of the studies looked at background (preloan) characteristics of students to 
analyze correlates of default.  The studies identified the following:  low family income, male, not 
having a high school diploma, ACT < 16, having a GED, and family size.  Two credit history 
characteristics were found to correlate; neither result was very surprising.  First, a prior default 
was found to be correlated with a student loan default.  Second, Monteverde (2000) found that a 
student’s credit score was (inversely) related to default.  He used TransUnion’s Empirica service 
  4
and found that these scores were predictive of default.  Woo (2002) found that three-fourths of 
defaults went into default with the first three years of repayment. 
 
 Note that race (minority status) has not been consistently shown to be correlated with 
defaults.  Knapp and Seeks (1992) found it to be correlated, but Steiner and Teszler (Texas 
Guaranteed Loan Corporation 2003) did not. 
 
 A number of articles have looked at student loan results at historically black colleges and 
universities (HBCUs) because there was some concern that if the federal government “tightened” 
regulations, then these institutions would be hurt the most, given the relatively low-income status 
of their students (see Blakey 2000).  According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, (1998)  
 
HBCUs have enrolled a higher percentage of freshmen who, compared with their 
peers at all institutions, are less prepared academically and come from more 
disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds … Students at HBCUs were twice as 
likely to come from a home where parents were divorced or separated, and their 
parents generally had lower education and income levels than parents of students 
at all colleges and universities. When the analysis is narrowed to only HBCUs the 
same pattern is found: In general, HBCUs with lower default rates enrolled 
students with more academic preparation and higher socioeconomic levels. (pp. 
2–3) 
 
An article that is often referenced in this literature is Galloway and Swail (1999).  They 
analyzed the default rates at the HBCUs and found that student retention was the key factor to 
reducing default rates.  They examined various institutional strategies intended to increase 
retention, which they lumped into five categories: 1) stiffer admissions criteria, 2) more 
proactive academic advising, 3) improved instruction (more one-on-one and practical 
instruction), 4) additional financial aid resources, and 5) enhanced student services, such as 
dormitory improvements and student counseling. Of these five strategies, this study found that 
instructional improvements and additional financial aid resources were the only strategies to be 
effective. Interestingly, stiffer entrance criteria and more proactive academic counseling were not 
effective in improving retention or decreasing default rates. 
 Other unsecured loans 
 Microenterprise loans are a form of economic development used mainly in developing 
countries.  Individuals are provided small loans, which generally are not collateralized, to start 
businesses.  The most successful of these are programs using the Grameen Bank (see Yunus 
1999), a program targeted on women loan recipients.  This program is successful because prior 
loan recipients control loan approval and do not lend until sufficient repayments have been 
made. Programs in U.S. inner cities were reviewed by Servon (1997).  In general, we found that 
while these loans were technically unsecured loans, their relevance to the Focus: HOPE student 
loans was not immediate.  Principals were smaller, and in some cases, sources of collateral were 
used (office machines, inventories, etc.) 
  5
Loan Fund Hypotheses 
The following list of hypotheses will be the main issues that we analyze statistically. The 
list classifies the hypotheses by whether they pertain to preprogram characteristics of individuals, 
performance in Focus: HOPE programs, or postprogram characteristics. 
 Preprogram characteristics 
H1: Loan repayment performance will not vary4 by demographic 
characteristics of program applicants such as race, sex, or age. 
 
H2: Loan repayment performance will differ for individuals with and without a 
cosigner. Cosigners will increase the likelihood of more positive 
outcomes. 
 
H3: Loan repayment performance will be lower for individuals who had been 
incarcerated prior to program application. 
 Program characteristics 
H4: Loan repayment performance will be better for individuals who completed 
all of the courses that they began.  Stated conversely, loan repayment 
performance will lag for individuals who did not complete a course in 
which they enrolled. 
 
H5: Loan repayment performance will differ for individuals who enroll in First 
Step or FAST TRACK from individuals who don’t.  The former will have 
lower performance. 
 
H6: Loan repayment performance will not differ between MTI and ITC 
students. 
 
H7: Loan repayment performance will not vary by the size of the student 
responsibility. 
 Postprogram characteristics 
H8: Loan repayment performance will differ across the marital and family 
status of applicants.  The presence of a spouse or own children will 
increase the likelihood of more positive outcomes. 
 
H9: The strongest correlates of repayment behavior will be employment and 
earnings subsequent to attending Focus: HOPE.  Higher levels of 
employment and earnings will be associated with higher levels of 
repayment. 
                                                 
4 Hypotheses will be tested statistically, so phrases like “will not vary” or “will differ” are meant to imply 
“in a statistically significant sense.”  Also, the hypotheses are intended to hold all other factors constant. 
  6
 
H10: Individuals with a training-related placement will have higher levels of 
repayment. 
 
H11: Loan repayment behavior will depend on the debt burden of program 
completers/ leavers.  Debt burden will be inversely related to repayment 
behavior. 
Training 
 The economic opportunities for young, disadvantaged, undereducated individuals in 
Detroit are bleak.  However, Focus: HOPE is confronting that bleakness by providing high-
quality training to the young (and older) folks who come through its door.  Its facilities and 
equipment are first rate.  Instructors have considerable industry experience and are excellent 
mentors and teachers.  For students whose basic academic preparation is lacking, Focus: HOPE 
offers the First Step and FAST TRACK programs.  Employer advisory groups are used to ensure 
an up to date, relevant curriculum.  One purpose of the evaluation study is to assess the 
effectiveness of the training in facilitating students’ entry into stable and good-paying careers. 
 
 One way to form expectations about the likelihood of success for the Focus: HOPE 
students is to review the literature base on skill training for disadvantaged populations after high 
school.    
 Literature on skill training effectiveness for disadvantaged populations 
 A large number of studies have weighed in on this topic, so we will primarily discuss 
articles that review and summarize other studies.  Most of these studies focus on federally funded 
job training programs—most recently through the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) and its 
successor, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA).    
 
 LaLonde (1995) reviewed studies of the effectiveness of CETA, JTPA, and other federal 
training programs for disadvantaged adults and youth.  His conclusions follow (excerpted from 
pp. 158–161): 
 
• Various services raise the postprogram earnings of disadvantaged adult 
women but have mixed or no effects on those of adult men or youth.  
Moreover, earnings gains for women tend to be “modest in size, persist for 
several years, arise from a variety of training strategies, and are sometimes 
achieved at remarkably little expense.” 
 
• There is less evidence on the value of classroom training and OJT, and the evidence 
that does exist is mixed. 
 
• The results for adult males are less encouraging. 
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• The National JTPA study offers no evidence that disadvantaged youths benefited 
from the low-cost training provided.   
 
 Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997) agree and disagree with the LaLonde 
summary.  The areas of agreement are for adult women and youth. 
 
Consistently strong evidence has accumulated that government training programs 
have been effective for adult women … Evidence has been accumulating for a 
number of years that training programs have been ineffective in producing lasting 
earnings effects for youth (pp. 1833–1834). 
 
However for adult males, they write 
 
Average earnings effects for adult men in JTPA were as large as those for women 
and also produced high rates of return even in the short run.  The JTPA finding 
for men, therefore, represents a significant break with the results of past 
evaluations (p. 1834). 
 
 In perhaps the most rigorous study, Orr et al. (1996) find very modest impacts of JTPA 
services for youth ages 16–21.  Using an experimental methodology, these researchers found no 
significant earnings impacts for females or males over 30 months of follow-up data.  Female 
participants in the treatment group were more likely to complete their high school diploma or 
GED and females had increased hours of training plus employment.  Virtually none of the 
outcomes were significant for males.  
 
 King, McPherson, and Long (2000) report starkly different findings.  Using a different 
methodology, they report the following: 
 
In contrast to the findings of the National JTPA Study (e.g., Bloom et al. 1997), 
participation in Occupational Skills Training (OST) is associated with 
employment and earnings success for both males and females, while participation 
in On the Job Training (OJT) and Job Search Assistance (JSA) seems to have 
such association only for males. Clearly, such results beg for validation using 
more rigorous experimental or quasi-experimental designs (p. 158). 
 
 Bartik and Hollenbeck (2004) reviewed a number of national evaluations of federal job 
training and many of sectoral training approaches as well.  They suggest that an effective system 
for skills development has the following characteristics: 
 
• The system offers training/educational opportunities that engender skills that 
are or will be in demand within the labor market area. 
 
• The training/educational opportunities do not focus solely on specific 
technical skills. 
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• The training or education integrates basic skills, employability skills, and 
technical skills and delivers curriculum that is tailored to the learners’ context. 
 
• Adequate support mechanisms are available to enable participants to benefit 
fully. 
 
• Caring, trained adult mentors are available when training and educational 
opportunities are targeted on youth (pp. 142–143). 
Training Hypotheses 
The outcomes that are analyzed in this evaluation are mainly labor market 
outcomes such as earnings and employment (especially training-related employment).  
We recognize that the training at Focus: HOPE may have important noneconomic 
outcomes such as health status, mobility, self-efficacy, or family/marital status, but these 
outcomes are more difficult to measure rigorously.  We do have some limited evidence 
about the noneconomic outcomes, but we would characterize this evidence as tentative.  
In general, the goal of the evaluation is to test the notion that completion of more training 
at Focus: HOPE will result in better labor market outcomes.  Some specific hypotheses 
follow: 
 
H1: Enrolling in and attending Focus: HOPE programs will result in better 
labor market outcomes. 
 
H2: Course completers will have better outcomes than individuals who did not 
complete all of their courses. 
 
H3: Among MTI and ITC students, individuals who successfully complete a 
sequence of courses will have better outcomes. 
 
H4: Holding the number of and completion of courses constant, there should 
be no difference in outcomes between individuals who started in First Step 
or FAST TRACK and those who didn’t. 
 
H5: Students who did not progress into a technical program in MTI or ITC, 
i.e., attended only First Step or FAST TRACK, will have poorer outcomes 
than students who did take machining or IT courses. 
 
 The next chapter of this report discusses the methodology and data sources upon 
which we have relied for the evaluation. That chapter is followed by a presentation of the 
statistical size and shape of the loan fund and the amount of training that is provided by 
Focus: HOPE. Chapters 4 and 5 present analyses of outcomes. In Chapter 4, we examine 
loan repayment behavior, and in Chapter 5, we examine employment and earnings 
outcomes. Finally, Chapter 6 presents our major findings and conclusions. 
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II.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES 
METHODOLOGY 
In the development of a pharmaceutical, companies go through rigorous experimentation 
to determine efficacy and safety.  In simplest terms, these companies will recruit a test 
population that has a range of characteristics and health conditions, and they will randomly 
assign a portion of the test population to the drug being tested (the treatment group). The 
remainder of the sample will get a placebo (the control group). After the drug regimen has been 
followed, the companies can compare the health status of the two groups and attribute any 
differences to the pharmaceutical being tested. 
 
If it were feasible and ethical to do so, Focus: HOPE could follow a similar protocol. A 
heterogeneous population of young adults encounters Focus: HOPE. These individuals have a 
range of characteristics and skills. Focus: HOPE could give them a random number as they walk 
through the door, and serve only those whose random number was less than 0.50 (the treatment 
group) and deny services to the others (control group). An evaluator could follow both groups, 
and the differences in outcomes between the two groups would be the net impact of the Focus: 
HOPE treatment. 
 
Such a random assignment experiment would provide the most rigorous estimate of the 
value-added of Focus: HOPE training programs, and it would provide excellent statistical 
estimators that could be used in a benefit-cost/return on investment framework. 
 
But the issue of experimental design is moot because Focus: HOPE has a commitment to 
and tradition of serving all who come to its door. Given that a random assignment experiment is 
not feasible, the key question is how best to evaluate the Focus: HOPE training programs. The 
main issues to address are as follows (not necessarily in order of importance): definition of the 
treatment, comparison group, and outcomes that will be measured. These issues are discussed 
briefly in the following paragraphs. 
Definition of the Treatment 
 In many ways, the education programs at Focus: HOPE for adults operate like a 
postsecondary educational institution.  A high school diploma or General Equivalency Degree 
(GED) is required for entrance.  Tuition is charged for each program.  The Center for Advanced 
Technologies (CAT) awards academic degrees.  Like some postsecondary institutions, Focus: 
HOPE offers its curriculum in an open-entry/open-exit (OE/OE) format.  Like all postsecondary 
institutions, young adults enter with different abilities and skills.  And like most postsecondary 
institutions, Focus: HOPE offers developmental courses to address basic skills deficiencies (First 
Step and FAST TRACK). 
 
Of course, Focus: HOPE is unique and differs from other institutions in some major 
ways.  First, the student body is composed almost exclusively of economically or educationally 
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disadvantaged young adults.  Second, the curriculum is focused and fairly sequential.  Students 
ideally proceed from First Step (optional, as needed) to FAST TRACK (optional, as needed) to 
either the Machinist Training Institute (MTI) or to the Information Technology Center (ITC).  
After completing the MTI program, students may proceed to the CAT.  In the MTI, students 
move sequentially from Vestibule to Core 1 to Pre-Engineering (Core 2).   
 
Thus, the “treatment” is a well-defined sequence of developmental and applied courses in 
the areas of machining or information technology. In this evaluation, the treatment group 
contains all individuals who enrolled in a Focus: HOPE course and were present for at least one 
class period during the analysis period. So defined, this group includes completers and 
noncompleters. We included both groups for two reasons. First, we wanted to analyze whether 
even a short-term exposure to Focus: HOPE would have value for a student. Second, we 
recognize that noncompletion may be a good outcome for some students if they find that they are 
not interested in a machining or IT career. We also realized that some students may complete 
their programs on an intermittent, interrupted basis.  
Comparison Group 
 The group against which the Focus: HOPE training participants are being compared is 
composed of applicants who take the placement tests and score at or above a 6th grade math 
ability and a 8th grade reading ability, but who do not participate in the training. Those grade 
equivalencies in math and reading are required of entering students. The advantages to using this 
group of individuals as a comparison group are severalfold. They are aware of the Focus: HOPE 
programs and interested enough in a potential career in machining or IT to complete an 
application and take the assessment tests. Since only the applicants who “pass” the test are 
selected, they are comparable to the participants in basic skills abilities. A disadvantage to using 
this group is that there may be systematic differences between them and the participants. The 
comparison group members chose not to participate in training for reasons such as they didn’t 
have the motivation, they couldn’t make appropriate arrangements, or they didn’t believe that it 
suited their needs/interests.   
Outcomes 
 The mission of Focus: HOPE is essentially to dignify the humanity of every person, so it 
is difficult to justify an evaluation of training programs that assesses success or failure based on 
their economic outcomes. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, we believe that the human capital 
framework captures the motivation of the trainees. These young adults want to achieve a high 
enough economic payoff in terms of earnings and stable employment to justify the time and 
expenses that they are investing in training. The two are not incompatible because Focus: HOPE 
sees as part of its mission moving people into the economic mainstream. 
 
Therefore the primary evaluation focus will be on labor market outcomes. These include 
employment, training-relatedness of the employment, unemployment, labor force participation, 
hours worked, wage rates, earnings, nonwage benefits, job retention/turnover, promotion, and 
on-the-job training. Two sources of data are being used. Wage record data from the Michigan 
Unemployment Insurance system allow analyses of employment, turnover, and earnings. 
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Surveys of participants and comparison group members measure wage rates, nonwage benefits, 
promotions, and on-the-job training.   
 
Other outcomes of interest include additional education/training, receipt of income 
assistance, credit worthiness, health status, family/relationship status, criminal/dangerous 
behaviors, asset ownership (cars, large-budget items), and psychosocial outcomes such as self-
efficacy.  These data are being collected by self-report through a survey of participants and 
comparison group members 
DATA SOURCES 
 The kernel of the evaluation is a longitudinal student data set, in Access, that has been 
constructed from documents, administrative records, and survey responses. The observations in 
the data set are categorized into eight cohorts. Six of the cohorts are defined by the date of first 
enrollment and by whether the individual is a treatment or comparison group member as shown 
in Table 2.1. The seventh cohort, which we actually refer to as cohort 0, are students who started 
their initial Focus: HOPE training prior to FY2002 and incurred a student loan. The eighth 
cohort, which we refer to as cohort 4, are individuals who were in the comparison cohorts and 
then became students at Focus: HOPE.   
 
Table 2.1  Definitions of Treatment and Comparison Cohorts 
Treatment cohorts Comparison cohorts 
0.     All students who started their initial Focus: HOPE 
(FH) prior to fiscal year (FY) 2002, and incurred a 
tuition charge. 
None 
1. All students who started their initial Focus: HOPE 
(FH) class in fiscal year (FY) 2002 (10/01–09/02) 
1. All individuals who tested between 07/01 and 
06/02 and scored at a level high enough to be 
enrolled, but didn’ta 
 
2. All students who started their initial FH class in FY 
2003 (10/02–09/03) 
2. All individuals who tested between 07/02 and 
06/03 and scored at a level high enough to be 
enrolled, but didn’t 
 
3. All students who start their initial FH class in FY 
2004 (10/03–09/04) 
3. All individuals who tested between 07/03 and 
06/04 and scored at a level high enough to be 
enrolled, but didn’t 
4.    Members of comparison groups who subsequently 
became students 
None 
aOn average, approximately three months pass between testing date and date of first enrollment, so in the definition 
of the comparison cohorts, we deliberately offset the time period by three months. 
 
 A noteworthy aspect of the definitions presented in the table is that an individual will be 
assumed to have received the “treatment,” even if they only attended class for one day. That is, 
enrollment at the beginning of class is the key characteristic. In general, Focus: HOPE only 
counts students if they stay in class long enough to incur a loan liability, which is approximately 
at least 20 percent of the entire course. This means that our count of students will be slightly 
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larger than the official Focus: HOPE enrollments, and that some of the students in the analysis 
will not have loan liabilities.   
 
 The sample sizes of the eight cohorts are given in Table 2.2. Note that these are not 
samples; they represent the universe of individuals in these cohorts. Altogether, we have almost 
7,300 individuals in the study. Of these, about 2,600 are individuals who incurred loans prior to 
2002. About 1,850 are students who enrolled in the three fiscal years of interest, and about 2,700 
are in comparison groups for the students. About 100 students who were in one of the 
comparison groups enrolled and took classes at Focus: HOPE since October 1, 2004.   
 
Table 2.2  Sample Sizes, by Cohort and Group 
Cohort Treatment Comparison Total 
0 2,603 — 2,603 
1 785 998 1,783 
2 570 928 1,498 
3 502 782 1,284 
4 104 — 104 
Total 4,564 2,708 7,272 
 
 Information about the individuals comprising the analysis data set comes from six 
sources: 1) application data and test scores, 2) student records, 3) class rosters, 4) loan payments, 
5) evaluation sample survey, and 6) wage record data. Not every individual will have 
information from each of these sources. For example, the comparison group does not, in general, 
have any student or loan information.5 Table 2.3 presents the number of records that have valid 
information from each of these sources.   
 
 The first row of the table shows records for which we have test score and application 
data. We accessed this data for the purpose of identifying members of the comparison group, so 
we anticipated having records for most of the members of both treatment and comparison 
members of cohorts 1, 2, 3, and 4 (note that cohort 4 is comprised of individuals from the 
comparison groups for cohorts 1, 2, and 3). Indeed, we have test scores for over 96 percent of the 
cases (4,501 out of 4,669). Unexpectedly, we found that we had test score/application data for 
some of the cohort 0 individuals who entered program before our analysis period. The 137 cases 
in the first cell of the table must be cohort 0 individuals who “stopped out,” reapplied, and thus 
tested to reenter the program. 
 
 The second row of data shows the counts of records from the Focus: HOPE student 
record data system. This is one of our primary sources of data about students. Again, we received 
data for almost all of the students, including cohort 0, as would be expected (4,545 out of 4,564). 
Having records for 38 comparison group cases (1.4 percent) is somewhat problematic. Some of 
these cases might be Focus: HOPE students who took classes prior to the implementation of the 
loan fund so they are not in cohort 0, “stopped out,” reapplied and tested, but did not reenroll. 
                                                 
5 As described below, some “contamination” occurred so that some of the comparison group members did 
attend Focus: HOPE classes and have some student and loan information. 
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Because they tested but did not reenroll, they would have been classified as a comparison group 
student for the evaluation purposes.  These cases may be considered “contaminated” in the 
classical experimental lingo because they received the “treatment.”   
 
Table 2.3  Record Counts, by Data Source 
Cohort/Group 
Data Source Cohort 0 
Cohort 1/
Comp. 
Cohort 1/
Treat. 
Cohort 2/
Comp. 
Cohort 2/
Treat. 
Cohort 3/ 
Comp. 
Cohort 3/ 
Treat. 
Cohort 4/ 
Treat. 
Application/Test score 137 998 759 927 557 782 376 102
Student records 2,599 16 781 16 567 6 497 101
Class rosters 2,600 1 785 0 570 0 497 104
Loan payments 
Info. from UAS/FH 
Info. from Shermeta 
Info. from both 
 
834 
1244 
382 
0
1
0
189
197
54
0
0
0
137
107
19
 
0 
0 
0 
 
89 
31 
1 
7
11
1
Evaluation survey 
Wave 1 
Wave 2 
Wave 3 
Wave 1&2 
Wave 1&3 
Wave 2&3 
Wave 1&2&3 
 
15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
85
72
91
24
21
31
9
122
98
88
53
38
42
28
99
99
109
27
33
39
10
123
96
78
48
39
34
19
 
0 
142 
126 
0 
0 
55 
0 
 
11 
150 
106 
6 
5 
59 
3 
4
36
38
1
3
18
0
Wage record 
Wave 1  
Wave 2 
Wave 3 
 
1,895 
2,022 
1 
777
747
706
614
628
612
713
714
670
421
472
458
 
1 
599 
575 
 
34 
404 
416 
16
74
82
Total sample 2,603 998 785 928 570 782 502 104
 
 The third row of data provides information from class rosters. These data were supplied 
to us after the fiscal year, and were used to identify individuals who actually attended at least one 
session of a class. These data were also a primary source of information for us because they 
provide information about loan liabilities, government payments, and student payments. Again, 
as would be expected, coverage is quite high (4,557 out of 4,564).   
 
 The next set of record counts displays information about cases that have made loan 
repayments or were expected to have made loan payments. That is, the record counts may 
include defaulters. The first row of entries comes from University Accounting Service (UAS) or 
Focus: HOPE, if payments were made directly there. These are records for which at least $1 in 
repayments had been made as of September 2005. The second row of counts reflects the cases 
that have been referred to collection by that date. Note that the two rows overlap, the extent of 
which is shown in the third row. About 460 cases that had been active in UAS have been referred 
to collections. 
 
 Three waves of a sample survey have been conducted by the survey unit at Wayne State 
University. The first wave was conducted in March/April 2004, the second was conducted about 
a year later in April/May 2005, and the third wave took place in Spring/Summer 2006. The 
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universe of the first wave was the first two cohorts of treatment and comparison cases, and the 
number of completions was 460. The universe for the second and third waves was all three 
cohorts of treatment and comparison group members. The number of completions was 700 and 
640 in the second and third wave, respectively. A fair number of individuals were in more than 
one of the survey waves as shown in the last four rows of this section of the table. These rows 
double- or triple-count individuals. For example, if a former Focus: HOPE student was a 
respondent to the second and third wave of the survey, then they would be counted in the Wave 2 
row, the Wave 3 row, and the Wave 2&3 row. If an individual was in all three waves, they would 
be counted in every single row of this section of the table. Altogether, a total of 1,281 individuals 
were interviewed at least once, about 27 percent of the total number of individuals in the three 
cohorts.   
 
 The final rows of data show the counts of records for which we have accessed wage 
record earnings data. Altogether, we have earnings information for 18 quarters from Q1:2002 to 
Q2:2006. These data came in three waves covering three (somewhat overlapping) periods of 
time: Q1:2002–Q3:2003; Q2:2003–Q2:2005; and Q3:2005–Q2:2006. The first request included 
the first two cohorts (treatment and comparison groups) plus cohort 0, and we received matched 
data for 4,471 out of a possible 5,913 cases (just over 75 percent). The second request was made 
for the entire analysis sample, and we again received matched data for about three-quarters 
(5,660 of 7,272). The third request was made for just the three cohorts, not the students with loan 
fund balances prior to FY2001. We received matched data for 3,519 cases out of 4,669—again a 
match rate of approximately 75 percent. 
 
 Table 2.4 provides some descriptive statistics relating to the cohorts. The race and sex 
data come from the student records data, so the table does not display these data items for the 
comparison groups. The data show that, by far, the largest share of the students are African 
American, and that a little over two-thirds of them are males. The last two items in the table are 
age at the time of testing into the program and average test score. We obtained these data from 
the application/testing files, of which we only got fiscal years 2002–2004 because our purpose in 
getting these data was to identify the comparison groups of individuals. The biggest difference in 
age between students and the comparison group is that a larger share of the former are aged 23–
36 at the time of testing. The comparison group has larger percentages of individuals less than 23 
and over 36. Finally, the mean test scores, which are grade equivalents, are about 0.5 grade 
equivalents higher for the treatment cases (enrolled students) than for the comparison group in 
both math and reading.   
 
 Table 2.5 displays the descriptive statistics, by program. The first column in the table 
shows the characteristics of students who enrolled in First Step or FAST TRACK and did not go 
on to enroll in either MTI or ITC. The second column shows data for individuals who attended 
MTI. They may have taken First Step or FAST TRACK before enrolling. The third column 
shows descriptive statistics for the ITC students; again, these students may have been in First 
Step or FAST TRACK prior to their enrollment. The data show that the ITC enrolled a larger 
share of females—still a minority, but 13 percentage points larger than in the MTI. The ITC 
students also tended to be older at the time of entrance testing. Almost 50 percent of them were 
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Table 2.4  Descriptive Statistics, by Cohort/Group 
Cohort/Group 
Characteristic Cohort 0 
Cohort 1/
Treat. 
Cohort 2/
Treat. 
Cohort 3/ 
Treat. 
Cohort 4/
Treat. 
Cohort 1/ 
Comp. 
Cohort 2/
Comp. 
Cohort 3/
Comp. 
Racea (%) 
African American 
White/Caucasian 
Other 
Unknown, incl. mixed 
 
83.6 
2.9 
1.4 
12.1 
 
93.2 
3.3 
1.8 
1.7 
 
94.9 
2.3 
2.0 
0.9 
 
91.7 
3.4 
2.4 
2.4 
 
93.1 
4.0 
2.0 
1.0 
 
— 
— 
— 
— 
 
— 
— 
— 
— 
 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Sexa (%) 
Male 
Female 
 
66.9 
33.1 
 
69.9 
30.1 
 
76.7 
23.4 
 
69.8 
30.2 
 
68.0 
32.0 
 
— 
— 
 
— 
— 
 
— 
— 
Age at testingb (%) 
< 18 
18–22 
23–26 
27–36 
> 36 
 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
 
4.0 
30.4 
20.0 
28.7 
16.8 
 
4.5 
26.6 
24.7 
29.8 
14.3 
 
2.8 
32.0 
19.1 
31.8 
14.4 
 
6.2 
36.1 
12.4 
22.7 
22.7 
 
3.2 
34.3 
19.3 
25.9 
17.4 
 
2.0 
32.4 
21.8 
27.5 
16.4 
 
3.1 
34.6 
17.3 
27.1 
17.9 
Mean, test scoreb 
Reading comp. 
Math 
 
— 
— 
 
11.3 
9.8 
 
11.5 
9.7 
 
11.6 
10.0 
 
11.9 
10.2 
 
11.1 
9.2 
 
11.1 
9.2 
 
11.3 
9.1 
Total sample 2,603 785 570 502 104 998 928 782 
aData come from student records, so comparison cases have missing information, denoted by —. 
bData come from application/testing records, so cohort 0 cases have mostly missing information, denoted by —. 
 
 
Table 2.5  Descriptive Statistics, by Focus: HOPE Program 
Program  
Characteristic 
First Step/ 
FAST TRACK only MTI ITC Total 
Race (%) 
African American 
White/Caucasian 
Other 
Unknown, incl. mixed 
 
95.6 
1.0 
0.5 
2.9 
 
91.5 
4.4 
2.0 
2.0 
 
70.5 
1.9 
2.0 
25.6 
 
87.6 
3.0 
1.7 
7.7 
Sex (%) 
Male 
Female 
 
67.9 
32.1 
 
72.6 
27.4 
 
58.7 
41.3 
 
69.1 
30.9 
Age at testing (%) 
< 18 
18–22 
23–26 
27–36 
> 36 
 
4.2 
39.0 
17.2 
25.2 
14.4 
 
5.0 
31.3 
20.7 
29.1 
13.9 
 
1.6 
25.4 
23.7 
30.4 
18.9 
 
3.7 
30.9 
21.0 
28.9 
15.5 
Mean, test score 
Reading comp. 
Math 
 
10.1 
7.7 
 
11.4 
10.5 
 
12.4 
10.4 
 
11.4 
9.9 
Total sample 1,099 2,249 785 4,133 
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over 26, compared to only about 40 percent for the MTI and First Step/FAST TRACK students. 
As would be expected, the MTI and ITC test scores were much higher than those for the First 
Step/FAST TRACK students; after all, the reason that the latter were in the developmental 
classes was because their test scores were low. The entry requirement in reading comprehension 
is higher for the ITC than the MTI. It is a 12th grade equivalent instead of an 8th grade 
equivalent. Thus, on average, the ITC students had higher reading comprehension test scores 
than the MTI students, but the math scores were about the same, on average. 
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III.  STATISTICAL PICTURE OF LOAN FUND AND TRAINING 
 This chapter provides some general statistics about the loan fund and training enrollments 
to give the reader a sense of the scope of the Focus: HOPE training operation and loan fund.  
Since the loan fund originated until the end of fiscal year 2005 (September 30, 2005), it appears 
as if there are approximately 3,800 students with loans (loan accounts).  Note that some of these 
loans may be deferred or not activated.6  The total loan principal is on the order of $14.8 million, 
which is the total tuition liability of students net of government payments, copayments, 
scholarships, or private support. 
 
 Enrollment has declined significantly over the past four years.  In fiscal 2002, total 
enrollment was about 1,040 students who enrolled in a little over 1,800 courses.  In 2003, total 
enrollment was about 830 in about 1,440 courses; in 2004, total enrollment was 720 in about 
1,250 courses.  In fiscal 2005, enrollment was about 560.  More detail about these aggregate 
statistics is provided in the following sections. 
LOAN FUND  
 Each of the courses offered by Focus: HOPE has a tuition.  The schedule of tuition 
charges is shown in Table 3.1.  As would be expected, the tuitions are determined by the length 
of the course and total hours of instruction.   
 
Table 3.1 Hours of Instruction and Tuition Charges, by Course  
Course Total hours of instruction Tuition ($) 
First Step (4 weeks) 160 1,000 
FAST TRACK (7 weeks) 280 1,700 
   
MTI 
Vestibule (5 weeks) 
 
200 
 
1,500 
Core 1 (26 weeks) 1,080 7,750 
Core 2 (Pre-engineering) (24 weeks)  660 4,000 
   
ITC 
Initial skills (2 weeks) 
 
40 
 
500 
Basic skills (5 weeks) 100 1,700 
PC technology (18 weeks) 360 4,000 
Network administration (27 weeks) 540 6,500 
Desktop & server administration (27 weeks) 540 6,500 
 
 If a student drops out of class within the add/drop period (approximately the first two 
weeks), there is no financial liability.  If a student drops out after that point in time, there is a 
                                                 
6 Data from Focus: HOPE showed that a cumulative total of 2,795 loans had been activated by the end of 
the 2004 fiscal year. 
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sliding scale for the amount of tuition owed.  Focus: HOPE uses the term student responsibility 
for the amount owed—either the full tuition or a prorated portion of it.  While students are in 
their training program (with the exception of First Step, FAST TRACK, and Vestibule), they are 
required to make a nominal copay of $10 per week.  If the student is eligible for government (or 
private sources of) aid, then Focus: HOPE invoices the appropriate entity.  The student’s loan 
principal is student responsible less copayments, less government (or private) aid.  This is 
referred to as the residual student responsibility. 
 
 After the course ends, loan repayments are deferred if the student enters another course, 
otherwise repayments are expected to begin on the first day of the month following the first full 
month after the last day the student attends class.  For example, if a class ends on January 15, 
then repayments would be due on March 1.  The loans carry a 5 percent annual interest rate 
starting one month after repayment begins.  Late fees of $15/month and any collection costs are 
added to the principal and interest.  When repayment is received, it is applied sequentially to late 
fees, interest, and principal reduction, in that order. 
 
 The terms of loans and the means of collection on the loans have changed over the years 
since the loan program was implemented.  Initially, Focus: HOPE administered all aspects of the 
loan including collection of payments.  In these first years of the loan program, the loans were 
set up with a fixed repayment amount and a variable term.  This allowed some flexibility in 
terms of changing the monthly payment obligation if economic circumstances warranted it.  In 
2003, Focus: HOPE started using University Accounting System (UAS) as its billing service.  
Since then, the loans have become fixed term (48 months).  The difference between the fixed- 
and variable-term loans may be significant.  Suppose a student had a residual responsibility of 
$3,500.  With a fixed term of 48 months at an annual interest rate of 5 percent, monthly 
payments would be $80.60.  Under the earlier regime, a payment of $100/month could have been 
established, and the term of the loan would have been 38 months.  If a payment of $50/month 
had been established, the term of the loan would have been 82 months.  If an individual defaults 
on a loan, Focus: HOPE refers the individual to the firm of Shermeta, Adams & Von Allmen, 
P.C. (hereafter referred to as Shermeta) for legal judgments and collection.   
Financial Statistics 
 The purpose of this section is to give the reader a general statistical picture of the scope 
of the loan fund.  It is difficult to be precise because the data constantly change with new loans 
or payments received, and because payment data came from three sources.  Furthermore, the 
time stamping of the data was prone to some error.  We have tried to validate the statistics that 
we have generated against internal (i.e., Focus: HOPE) memoranda.  Fortunately, we have not 
found major discrepancies.  Generally, the data we have tabulated are within +/− 5 percent of 
comparable internal figures.   
 
 Like any financial entity, the loan fund can be characterized by its balances and by its 
annual inflows and outflows (payments received and loans disbursed).  Balances depict 
situations as of a particular point in time.  The inflows and outflows occur over a year.  Table 3.2 
shows tuition earned and residual student responsibility balances as of the end of the fiscal year, 
and it shows changes in those balances during the year.  Note that the first and third column of 
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data are balances (cumulative totals); whereas the other two columns are flows, or annual 
changes in the cumulative totals. 
 
Table 3.2  Loan Fund Balances, by Academic Year (in $million, not adjusted for inflation) 
Academic 
year Tuition earned ($) 
Change in tuition 
earned ($) 
Residual student 
responsibility ($) 
Change in residual 
student responsibility ($) 
1997–98 0.887 0.887 0.160 0.160 
1998–99 4.315 3.428 1.555 1.395 
1999–00 7.643 3.328 3.232 1.677 
2000–01 11.841 4.198 5.792 2.560 
2001–02 16.093 4.252 8.287 2.495 
2002–03 19.343 3.251 10.679 2.392 
2003–04 22.308 2.965 13.244 2.565 
2004–05 24.266 1.957 14.778 1.534 
 
 The table shows that the total tuition since the inception of the tuition policy has reached 
a cumulative total of over $24 million by 2005.  The largest years of growth in this figure were in 
2001 and 2002, when over $4 million in tuition was accrued by students.  The third column of 
data, residual student liability, represents the cumulative total value of loan contracts made with 
students since the inception of the loan fund.  The difference between tuition earned and student 
responsibility is copayments and governmental (or private) grants.  Note that the third column 
reflects the total principal that is or ever has been due; it is not the same as the current 
outstanding principal. 
 
 Table 3.3 shows the trends in copays and grants.  Total copays were about $90–$100 
thousand in 2001 through 2003, but dropped off in 2004 and 2005 with enrollment drops.  Grants 
have dropped off precipitously from almost $2 million in 1999 to less than $400 thousand in 
2004 and 2005.  The data in Table 3.3 are annual values. 
 
Table 3.3  Copays and Grants, by Academic Year (in $million, not adjusted for inflation) 
Academic 
year 
Change in tuition 
earned ($) Copays ($) Grant receipts ($) 
Change in residual 
student responsibility ($) 
1997–98 0.887 0.016 0.711 0.160 
1998–99 3.428 0.066 1.967 1.395 
1999–00 3.328 0.064 1.587 1.677 
2000–01 4.198 0.094 1.544 2.560 
2001–02 4.252 0.106 1.651 2.495 
2002–03 3.251 0.091 0.768 2.392 
2003–04 2.965 0.063 0.337 2.565 
2004–05 1.957 0.052 0.371 1.534 
 
Total 24.266 0.552 8.936 14.778 
 
 The next table of aggregate loan fund data, Table 3.4, shows among other things the net 
position of the loan fund after considering loans made and inflows of payments against principal, 
fees, and interest.  The last column of data represents the net position of the loan fund.  If we 
define viability as being at a break-even point, then this table entry should be $0, representing 
loans disbursed (net of copays and grants) would equal inflows of payments against principal, 
interest, and fees.  Since 2000, there is a downward trend in the net outflow despite a reduction 
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in grants.  If other things were equal, the significant decline in grant receipts would mean a 
significant increase in loan disbursements.  However, two factors probably explain the reduced 
net outflow.  First, repayments are increasing, and second, overall enrollments are declining so 
that student loan obligations are staying about even despite reduced grant support.   
 
Table 3.4  Inflows and Outstanding Loan Balances, by Academic Year (in $million, not 
adjusted for inflation) 
Academic 
year 
Change in 
residual student 
responsibility ($) 
Payments against 
principal ($) 
Change in 
outstanding 
principal ($) 
Fees and interest 
payments ($) 
Loan fund net 
outflow ($) 
1997–98 0.160 0 0.160 0 0.160 
1998–99 1.395 0 1.395 0 1.395 
1999–00 1.677 0.036 1.641 0 1.641 
2000–01 2.560 0.164 2.396 0 2.396 
2001–02 2.495 0.177 2.318 0.075 2.243 
2002–03 2.392 0.245 2.147 0.125 2.022 
2003–04 2.565 0.319 2.246 0.087 2.159 
2004–05 1.534 0.293 1.241 0.108 1.133 
 
Total 14.778 1.233 13.545 0.395 13.149 
Repayment and Default Rates 
 As described above, we have about 4,460 students in our database plus some of the 
comparison cases seemed to have been students at one point in time.  If we define repayment or 
default rates in terms of students who have loan obligations, the denominator will be 
considerably smaller than the number of students in the data set.  This is because some students 
did not stay in any class long enough to incur a tuition charge.  Some students had tuition fully 
paid by grants, and some students have had their loans deferred.   
 
 The 2004 audit by Focus: HOPE indicated that a cumulative total of about $7.325 million 
in loan principal had been declared in default.  Based on a trend analysis, we estimate that 
approximately $0.15 million would have been declared in default in 2005, for an estimated 
cumulative default of about $7.475 million.  Table 3.4 notes that the total loan principal for 
students was about $14.778 million.  The 2004 audit indicates that about $11.38 million in loan 
contracts were in repayment.  Our trend analysis suggests that approximately $1.0 million more 
would have been put into repayment in 2005, so the total loans for which some repayment was 
expected was about $12.4 million.  So, on a dollar basis, the default rate is approximately 60 
percent ($7.475/$12.4).  Note that the numerator and denominator of this fraction include the 
“loans” made to students from the Detroit Enterprise Zone (EZ).  Private communication with 
Ken Kudek suggested that the principal for these loans may have totaled $0.68 million.  If we 
subtract this figure from the numerator and denominator, the default rate drops to about 58 
percent.  These percentages likely underestimate the default rate because they essentially assume 
that none of the recent loans will go into default.   
 
 Another way to estimate the default rate on a dollar basis comes from the 2004 audit.  
According to those figures, the cumulative principal in loans that were making payment was 
about $1.78 million and the cumulative principal in loans that were in default was $7.325 
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million.  In other words, the default principal was about four times as large as the repayment 
principal.  This implies a default rate of 0.80.  So our estimate of the default rate is between 
$0.60 to $0.80 on the dollar, which implies that the repayment rates calculated on a dollar basis 
would be between $0.20 and $0.40.   
 
 The default rates on a dollar basis are quite high such that the loan fund has a net outflow 
shown in Table 3.4 of over $1–$2 million per year.  As a business model, this is not viable.  
However the sum of total payments shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 is about $2.2 million.7  That 
may represent a significant source of revenue to Focus: HOPE, especially as public grant dollars 
recede.  Furthermore, it may be argued that such a level of payments from an economically 
disadvantaged population exceeds expectations. 
 
 The previous discussion examines default and repayment rates on a dollar basis.  
Repayment rates can be calculated on a person basis from the information on the number of 
individuals with loans, making payments, and receiving grants provided in Table 3.5.  Note that 
we have eliminated duplicates in each of the columns, but there is double counting across the 
columns because, for example, an individual may have received a grant or incurred a loan for 
courses taken in two or more years.  Also, an individual may have made some repayments, but 
then stopped and was declared in default.  To be precise, we found just about 70 percent 
(1,521/2,180) of the individuals who received a grant also incurred a loan, and about 50 percent 
(592/1,222) of the individuals who ever made a payment were eventually declared a default. 
 
 Calculation of repayment and default rates from Table 3.5 data is complicated by the 
significant overlap between the last two columns.  Of the 3,796 individuals who incurred a loan 
(column 2), apparently 760 have neither made a repayment nor been declared in default.  These 
individuals must have loans that have been deferred, are in process, or are in nonpayment status, 
but not long enough to be declared in default.  Eliminating these 760 cases from the denominator 
yields a repayment rate, defined as making at least one payment, of 40.3 percent and a default 
rate (on a person basis) of 79.3 percent (these percentages add up to more than 100 because some 
persons make a partial repayment before going into default).  Altogether, the tables of financial 
information show us that the average student loan is $3,893.  About 4 students in 10 make any 
repayment, and their average total repayment has been about $1,332, of which $1,009 has been 
used to reduce principal. 
TRAINING 
 The education program at Focus: HOPE has three major “departments” with students in 
the loan fund—First Step/FAST TRACK, MTI, and ITC.8  The purpose of this section is to 
provide aggregate data on enrollments, courses taken, and course completions for these 
departments.  The data pertain only to the last four full years. 
 
                                                 
7 These data are through September 2005.  Recently, Focus: HOPE celebrated passing the $3 million mark 
in payments received. 
8Again, the Center for Advanced Technologies (CAT) is not included in this evaluation.  
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Table 3.5  Individuals with Loans, Grants, Repayments, and in Default, by Academic Year 
(Columns are unduplicated counts) 
Academic 
year Received grant Incurred loan 
Made repayment of 
at least $1 Declared in default 
1997–98 196 105 0 0 
1998–99 443 639 0 0 
1999–00 323 473 104 168 
2000–01 508 582 251 546 
2001–02 313 672 225 442 
2002–03 160 533 183 228 
2003–04 138 429 251 682 
2004–05 99 363 208 280 
Unknown year    60 
Total 2,180 3,796 1,222 2,406 
Enrollments, by Program 
 In the last four years, annual enrollment averaged 788 students; however, there has been a 
downward trend in enrollment from 1,042 to 830 to 722 to 559 in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, 
respectively.  (These counts reflect some duplication from year to year, although duplication 
within a year has been eliminated.  Specifically, this is the number of individuals who were 
enrolled in a course that met at least one day during the fiscal year.  So if an individual was in a 
course that crossed fiscal years, or if the individual took one course in one fiscal year and then 
another course in another fiscal year, they would have been counted in each year.)  Concomitant 
with the reduction in enrollments over this four-year period has been a reduction in the number 
of class offerings.  There were 110 classes in 2002, but this dropped to 76, 73, and 71 in 2003, 
2004 and 2005, respectively. 
 
 Enrollment in First Step/FAST TRACK has trended downward.  It has averaged 264 
students per year; with 357, 281, 247, and 170 in the last four years, respectively.  The MTI 
enrollment had been relatively stable, although it dropped significantly in 2005.  Its enrollments 
were 435, 386, 403, and 292, respectively.  That averages 379 students per year.  The ITC 
enrollment declined fairly drastically from 2002 to 2004, but then held fairly constant in 2005.  
Its enrollments were 366, 258, 185, and 173, respectively.  That averages 246 students per year.   
Completions 
 During the last four years, each student enrolled in 1.70 classes, on average.  The total 
number of students in all of the courses offered was 1,816, 1,385, 1234, and 965 in the four 
years, respectively. As would be expected, not all of the courses were completed.  In 2002, there 
were 1,146 completions out of the 1,816 students on the rolls (63.1 percent), and in 2003, the 
completion rate was 62.1 percent (860 out of 1,385).  In 2004 and 2005, the rates were 58.6 
percent and 58.3 percent, respectively.  The completion rates for First Step and FAST TRACK 
were 83.7, 78.2, 82.2, and 79.4 percent in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively.  The ITC 
and MTI had lower completion rates.  For MTI, the course completion rates over the four years 
were 44.3, 49.5, 47.4, and 49.4 percent.  Finally, the completion rates for ITC courses showed a 
fairly significant downward trend at 73.4, 68.2, 62.1, and 60.0 percent.  This downward trend in 
the ITC may be an indicator to watch. 
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 It should be noted that some of the noncompletion occurred because students transferred 
between sections. A student may start in one class but then encounter a problem (such as an 
illness or transportation difficulty), “drop” the class, and reenroll in a later class.  MTI classes 
had the highest number and rate of transfers.  Over the four years, MTI had total enrollments of 
2,577.  It had 1,220 course completions (47.3 percent), and it had 343 transfers (13.3 percent).  
To compare, the transfer rate for the ITC was 7.9 percent, and the transfer rate for First 
Step/FAST TRACK was 5.0 percent. 
Student Evaluations of the Training 
 As a final descriptive source of data about training, we provide student evaluation data 
that were collected as part of the evaluation survey.  This survey asked respondents who had 
been Focus: HOPE students, i.e., the treatments, some evaluative questions about their 
experiences at Focus: HOPE.  Table 3.6 presents these data.  In all, the students had very positive 
opinions about different aspects of the training that they received, and about how much job 
knowledge had been given to them. 
 
Table 3.6  Student Evaluations of Focus: HOPE 
Training characteristic 
Percent 
dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied
Percent satisfied or 
very satisfied 
Sample 
size 
Day(s) and time(s) of the Focus: HOPE classes 16.8 83.2 303 
Class materials and equipment 6.3 93.7 301 
Knowledge of the instructor 5.3 94.7 303 
Clarity of the instructor 9.2 90.8 303 
Location of Focus: HOPE 5.3 94.7 303 
How the instructor tried to understand yours needs and meet them 8.6 91.4 304 
Training gave you a good idea about the following aspects of the 
jobs being trained for: Percent No Percent Yes  
 
How much you could earn 23.3 76.7 301 
Benefits you could get 23.9 76.1 301 
Type of people you would work with 17.2 82.8 302 
Type of problems/challenges you might face 17.8 82.2 303 
Things you need to do to meet your boss’s expectations. 13.0 87.0 300 
SOURCE:  Wave 3 of Evaluation Survey. 
 
 In short, the status of the Focus: HOPE education programs seems to be one of a sharp 
downward trend in enrollment and some reduction in the percentages of students who complete 
their courses.  The loan fund has made almost $15 million in loans to about 3,800 individuals.  
Default rates are substantial although the loan fund’s annual net outflow has decreased over time.  
Also on the more positive side, the students who receive the training seem quite satisfied with 
almost every aspect of their Focus: HOPE experiences.   
 
 The next two chapters of the report will turn to an analysis of loan repayment behavior 
and net outcomes for Focus: HOPE students. 
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IV.  STUDENT LOAN REPAYMENT BEHAVIOR9  
Tuition has been established for each of the Focus: HOPE programs, and every student 
who enrolls agrees to repay their tuition through a combination of government funding sources 
and loan repayments.  The loans represent contractual obligations between the students and 
Focus: HOPE to pay the residual balance between tuition and grant payments such as Pell grants, 
Work First grants, WIA training grants, and dual enrollment over an extended period of time 
after training completion.  Like most student loans, the Focus: HOPE loans are unsecured.  
Students are required to make modest copays while they are attending classes (approximately 
$10 per week).  The balances are deferred as long as the students are enrolled at Focus: HOPE, 
and then the repayments that are captured are applied to late fees, interest, and principal in that 
order.  
 
 We analyzed the repayments made by individuals to Focus: HOPE by examining three 
outcome variables.  None of these variables include copayments.  The outcomes were as follows: 
 
• Amount repaid.  This variable constructed from the loan payment data from Focus 
Hope, UAS, and Shermeta is the sum of all repayments made by an individual 
student.   
 
• Payment status.  This variable is constructed from the loan payment data.  If the 
student made at least one payment, then this variable is set to 1; otherwise it is a 0.  
 
• Default status.  This variable is set to 1 if Focus: HOPE has formally set the status of  
a loan to default; otherwise it is a 0.  This information originated in the Audit Repay 
file supplied by Focus: HOPE.   
 
Each of these outcome variables measure a different dimension of repayment behavior, and 
therefore has a distinct statistical distribution.  While a continuous variable can (at least 
conceivably) take on an infinite number of values, a binary variable may only take on two 
values.   
 
 Different statistical techniques are required for these two types of data.  For the 
continuous variable, amount repaid, we use tobit regressions.  Tobits are a specialized form of 
linear regression that are most appropriate when a large number of observations are clustered at 
zero.  In our case, there are a large number of students who have “amount repaid” equal to zero.  
The coefficient of tobit regressions can be interpreted as the slope of a line.  A one-unit change 
in the explanatory variable will produce an expected change in the outcome variable equal to the 
coefficient estimate for this linear function.   
 
                                                 
9 The appendix to this report has a copy of text from Hollenbeck and DeRango (2005) that describes 
simulation modeling of the student loan fund. 
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 The probit regression technique is a method that compresses the effects of all control 
variables in such a way as to restrict all predicted values of the outcome variable between zero 
and one.  However, unlike the coefficients in a tobit, interpreting the economic meaning of a 
coefficient estimate in a probit regression is difficult because the underlying function is 
nonlinear.  Thus, compared to the linear tobit, a one-unit change in the control variable in a 
probit regression may cause a larger or smaller change in the predicted value depending on the 
slope of the nonlinear function at that particular value. 
 
 Population means for Amount repaid and Payment status for program type, cosigner 
status, and number of courses completed are displayed in Table 4.1.  For students who have 
exited Focus: HOPE and have a student loan liability, the average amount paid back is $449.38.  
That average is deflated considerably by a large number of students who have not made any 
repayment.  In fact, only about one-third have made a repayment on their loans (i.e., about two-
thirds have not made any repayment).  Among the individuals who had made a repayment, the 
average amount repaid was $1,362.   
 
 The last column in the table shows that there is little difference among program types in 
the percentage of students who had made a repayment; it was around 35 percent for all three 
groups.  Students who took only First Step or FAST TRACK would have much smaller loans 
than students who took courses in the MTI or ITC.  Thus, the data show that their repayments, on 
 
Table 4.1  Repayment Amounts and Status through 2005, by Program, CoSigner Status, 
and Number of Courses Completed  
Variable name 
Average repayments 
for total sample ($)  
Average repayments for 
individuals who had 
made a repayment ($) 
Percent of students with at 
least one payment (%) 
Overall 449.38 1,361.79 33.0 
    
First Step/FAST TRACK only 287.88a 854.68a 33.7a 
ITC 611.31 1,699.49 36.0 
MTI 535.42 1,460.15 36.7 
    
Cosigner 520.49 1,243.40b 41.9b 
No cosigner 427.62 1,411.84 30.3 
    
Completed courses    
0 159.07c 699.91c 22.7c 
1 318.97d 1,113.41d 28.6d 
2 625.07 1,611.33 38.8 
3 or more 726.31 1,691.11 42.9 
SOURCE:  Audit Control File spreadsheet. 
NOTE: aStatistically significantly different from ITC or MTI.  (Note ITC and MTI not statistically significantly 
different.) 
bStatistically significantly different from no cosigner.   
cStatistically significantly different from one or more completed courses.   
dStatistically significantly different from two or more courses. 
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average, are much smaller.  For students who had made some repayments, the averages were 
about $850, $1,460, and $1,700 for First Step/FAST TRACK only, MTI, and ITC students, 
respectively.  Whether a student had a cosigner made a big difference in terms of making any 
payment.  Over 40 percent of individuals with a cosigner had made a payment, whereas only 
about 30 percent without a cosigner have made a payment.  On the other hand, the average 
amount repaid for individuals who had made some payment was slightly lower for individuals 
with a cosigner.   
 
 The last panel of data in the table shows a cross-tabulation of repayments by the number 
of courses completed.  Loan balances increase with the number of courses, so the increase in 
average payments as number of courses increases is expected.  However, the increase in the 
payment percentage as number of courses increase is less tautological.  Completing a second 
course or more than two classes is associated with an increase in the payment propensity of over 
10 percentage points, and three or more courses has a higher percentage than just two. 
 
 So an examination of simple cross-tabs of the repayment data suggests that program does 
not influence heavily whether an individual will repay, but it does affect how much they repay if 
they make any payment.  Having a cosigner seems to affect both repayment propensity and 
amount, as does the number of completed classes.  The next section looks at these and other 
factors in a multivariate regression framework. 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF REPAYMENT BEHAVIOR 
 First, we present the tobit regressions of the Amount repaid variable and analyze what 
they reveal about the eleven hypotheses enumerated in the first chapter regarding preprogram, in-
program, and postprogram characteristics.  Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present estimates from tobit 
models in which Amount repaid is the dependent variable.  In the first table, the models were 
estimated for the full sample of students, and the second table uses data from the third wave of 
the evaluation survey.  The first table shows coefficients from two specifications.  The first 
specification categorizes students as having enrolled in First Step or FAST TRACK classes or 
not (reference case.)  The second specification categorizes students as having enrolled in MTI, 
ITC, or neither (reference case).  The second table replicates these specifications, but includes 
variables that are only on the evaluation survey—family status, training-related placement, felon 
status, and debt. 
 
 The coefficient column in the tables shows the estimated increase or decrease in total 
student repayments to Focus: HOPE of a one-unit change in the explanatory variable.  The p-
value indicates the probability that the true coefficient is actually zero and the estimate derived 
for the sample is merely due to random variation in the data.  A p-value near zero indicates 
strong evidence against the randomness interpretation.  A p-value near one indicates that 
randomness is likely the cause of the nonzero result. 
 
 The preprogram characteristics are shown first. Table 4.2 shows that age and race are 
statistically significant negative explanators of the amount repaid, contrary to our hypothesis. 
Note that in Table 4.3, these effects are still negative, but the small sample size has attenuated 
the statistical precision of the estimates.  Holding other things constant, older individuals and  
  27
Table 4.2 Tobit Estimates of a Model of Amount Repaid Using Full Sample  
Characteristic Coefficient P>׀t׀ Coefficient P>׀t׀ 
Preprogram characteristics     
H1: Demographics     
       Age −33.8*** 0.000 −31.4*** 0.000 
       Male 9.7 0.935 −61.9 0.603 
       African American −1,113*** 0.000 −1,026*** 0.000 
H2: Did loan have cosigner 490.4*** 0.000 514.9*** 0.000 
In-program characteristics     
H4: Effect of  course completion     
        Number classes completed 304.7*** 0.001 333.4*** 0.000 
        Has at least one class not completed −343.5*** 0.002 −483.5*** 0.000 
H5:  Student attended FS/FT 216.2* 0.088 — — 
H6:  MTI students — — 336.4** 0.026 
        ITC students — — −159.6 0.385 
H7: Loan size 0.041* 0.069 0.036 0.101 
       Amount of grants received  −0.004 0.883 −0.032 0.165 
Postprogram characteristics     
H9:  Average quarterly earnings 0.194*** 0.000 0.191*** 0.000 
Have wage data 461.4*** 0.001 448.7*** 0.001 
NOTE:  Number of observations = 2,903; pseudo R-squared = 0.0150 for specification 1 and 0.0155 for specification 2.   
— indicates variable was not included in the specification.  * = statistically significant at the 10% level; ** = 
statistically significant at the 5% level; *** = statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 4.3  Tobit Estimates of a Model of Amount Repaid Using Evaluation Survey 
Characteristic Coef. P>׀t׀ Coef. P>׀t׀ 
Preprogram characteristics     
H1: Demographics    
       Age −9.5 0.573 −5.9 0.724 
       Male 355.9 0.220 369.4 0.209 
       African American −765 0.201 −556 0.348 
H2: Did loan have cosigner 418.2 0.218 703.3** 0.034 
H3: Felon −1,072 0.132 −1,391* 0.060 
In-program characteristics     
H4: Effect of  course completion     
       Number classes completed −287.0 0.282 −57.7 0.799 
       Has at least one class not completed −1,059*** 0.000 −1,294*** 0.000 
H5: Student attended FS/FT 461.9 0.188 — — 
H6: MTI students — — 1,007** 0.022 
       ITC students — — 1,338*** 0.002 
H7: Loan size 0.049 0.388 −0.062 0.259 
       Amount of grants received  0.067 0.352 −0.038 0.580 
Postprogram characteristics     
H8: Family status −60.6 0.826 −7.0 0.980 
H9: Average quarterly earnings 0.179*** 0.002 0.191*** 0.001 
Have wage data 808.3** 0.030 719.7* 0.052 
H10: Training-related placement −756.0** 0.035 −760.9** 0.034 
H11: Debt 0.003 0.529 0.001 0.789 
NOTE: Number of observations = 202; pseudo R-squared = 0.0237 for specification 1 and 0.0291 for specification 2.  
— indicates variable was not included in the specification.  * = statistically significant at the 10% level; ** = 
statistically significant at the 5% level; *** = statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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African Americans have lower repayment amounts.  Gender does not have a significant impact 
on repayment amount.  A student with a cosigned loan has repaid about $500 more than an 
otherwise identical student whose loan does not have a cosigner.  In Table 4.3, we have added 
the variable of whether an individual self-reported have been convicted of a felony.  The 
estimated coefficient is approximately −$1,000 to −$1,400, which confirms our hypothesis.   
 
 The middle panel summarizes the estimated effects of in-program characteristics on 
amount repaid.  Completing a course is associated with higher repayments in the full sample 
tobit specifications, but the coefficients are not statistically significant (nor even of the right 
sign) in the equations estimated from the evaluation survey.  However, having at least one 
incomplete course is strongly negative in all of the tobits.  Not completing a class reduces total 
payments by $350 to $500 in the full sample model, and by $1,000 or more in the evaluation 
survey estimates. 
 
 Interestingly, the hypothesis that stated that First Step/FAST TRACK students would not 
pay back as much as students who were in MTI or ITC was not borne out by the estimates.  The 
estimates are all positive, although not always statistically significant that attending First 
Step/FAST TRACK tended to increase the amount of repayment, holding other factors constant.  
The coefficients of the MTI and ITC variables compare payments to students who only took First 
Step/FAST TRACK.  With the exception of one of the coefficients in Table 4.2, these estimates 
are all large and significant.  In the evaluation survey estimates, the ITC students who repay are 
estimated to have paid about $300 more in total repayments than the MTI students who paid.   
 
 One might expect loan size to have a positive correlation with the amount repaid given 
that an individual has made some payment, but this is, at best, weakly borne out in the coefficient 
estimates. In the full sample, the point estimates are positive and one of them is significant. In 
the evaluation survey, the signs are inconsistent, with one of the estimates being significantly 
negative. The total amount of grants received by the student does not seem to influence the 
amount of repayment.   
 
 The bottom part of the tables contains the Tobit results for postprogram characteristics. 
Average quarterly earnings are strongly associated with increased repayments in all 
specifications in both samples, as might be expected. For every additional dollar earned by a 
student per quarter after exiting Focus: HOPE, the estimates suggest that they will ultimately pay 
between $0.13 and $0.19, on average. In the evaluation survey data, we find that family status 
(being married or living with own children) and level of debt do not have a statistically 
significant impact on total repayments. Inexplicably, having a training-related placement has a 
negative impact on the total amount repaid.   
 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 summarize the results from estimating Probit models of the binary 
outcome variables:  payment status and default status. These tables do not contain the coefficient 
estimates from the regressions because the magnitude of the numbers themselves is difficult to 
interpret. Instead, the tables display the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients. The 
first table shows the estimates of the models of payment status and default status estimated from  
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Table 4.4  Signs and Significance of Probit Estimates of Payment and Default Status Using 
the Full Sample 
Characteristic Payment status Default status 
Preprogram characteristics 
H1: Demographics 
       Age 
       Male 
       African American 
H2: Did loan have cosigner 
 
 
( − )*** 
( + )  
( − )*** 
( + )** 
 
 
( − )*** 
( − ) 
( − )*** 
( + )** 
 
 
( + )*** 
( − ) 
( + )*** 
( + )*** 
 
 
( + )** 
( − ) 
( + )*** 
( + )*** 
In-Program characteristics 
H4: Effect of course completion 
       Number classes completed 
       Has at least one class not completed 
H5: Student attended FS/FT 
H6: MTI students 
       ITC students 
H7: Loan size 
 
 
( + )*** 
( − )* 
( + ) 
— 
— 
( − )*** 
 
 
( + )** 
( − )** 
— 
( + ) 
( − ) 
( − )*** 
 
 
( − ) 
( + )  
( − ) 
— 
— 
( + )*** 
 
 
( − ) 
( + )  
— 
( + )*** 
( + )*** 
( + )*** 
Postprogram characteristics 
H9:  Average quarterly earnings 
 
( + )*** 
 
( + )*** 
 
( − )*** 
 
( − )*** 
NOTE: Number of observations = 2,903; pseudo R-squared = 0.0753 for specification 1 of payment status; 0.0769 for 
specification 2 of payment status; 0.0209 for specification 1 of default status; and 0.0286 for specification 2 of 
default status.  — indicates variable was not included in the specification.  * = statistically significant at the 10% 
level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; *** = statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 4.5  Signs and Significance of Probit Estimates of Payment and Default Status Using 
the Evaluation Survey 
Characteristic Payment status Default status 
Preprogram characteristics 
H1: Demographics 
       Age 
       Male 
       African American 
H2: Did loan have cosigner 
H3: Felon 
 
 
( + ) 
( − ) 
( + ) 
( + )** 
— 
 
 
( + ) 
( − ) 
( + ) 
( + )** 
— 
 
 
( − )* 
( + )  
— 
( − )*** 
( + )  
 
 
( − )* 
( − ) 
— 
( − )** 
( + ) 
In-program characteristics 
H4: Effect of  course completion 
       Number classes completed 
       Has at least one class not 
completed 
H5: Student attended FS/FT 
H6: MTI students 
       ITC students 
H7: Loan size 
 
 
( + ) 
( − )* 
( − ) 
— 
— 
( − ) 
 
 
( − ) 
( − )** 
— 
( + )** 
( + )*** 
( − ) 
 
 
( − )*** 
( + )* 
( + )*** 
— 
— 
( + ) 
 
 
( − ) 
( + ) 
— 
( + ) 
( + ) 
( − ) 
Postprogram characteristics 
H8: Family status 
H9: Average quarterly earnings 
H10: Training-related placement 
H11: Debt 
 
( − ) 
( + )*** 
( − ) 
( − ) 
 
( + )  
( + )*** 
( − ) 
( − ) 
 
( − ) 
( + ) 
( + ) 
( + )* 
 
( − ) 
( + ) 
( + ) 
( + )* 
NOTE: Number of observations = 202; pseudo R-squared = 0.1029 for specification 1 of payment status; 0.1284 for 
specification 2; 0.1158 for specification 1 of default status; and 0.0616 for specification 2.  — indicates variable was 
not included in the specification.  * = statistically significant at the 10% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% 
level; *** = statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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the full sample of students. The second table, Table 4.5, has payment and default status model 
estimates from the evaluation survey. 
 
In general, we would expect the independent variables in these models to have opposite 
signs for payment vis-à-vis for default.  That is usually the case, but not always.  Among the 
preprogram characteristics, age and race again seem to be negatively related to repayment 
propensity, and positively related to default.10  Having a cosigner has the expected sign and is 
significant in the models estimated using the evaluation survey data (Table 4.5); however, in 
Table 4.4, having a cosigner is positively correlated to both payment and default.  The behavior 
that this suggests is that having a cosigner results in students starting to repay, but ultimately 
defaulting at a higher rate.  Because the number of (self-reported) felons is so small in the 
evaluation survey, the probit estimates were not stable (and not possible for payment status).  
The point estimate shows a tendency toward default. 
 
Among the in-program characteristics, course taking and completing also seem to have 
the expected signs, although not all of the coefficients are significant.  More completed courses 
are positively correlated with payment and negatively correlated with default; having at least one 
noncompleted course has exactly opposite effects.  The size of the loan is a strong predictor of 
payment or default.  In the earlier analyses, loan size did not seem to have a strong effect on the 
amount of repayments, but the models presented here indicate that larger loans clearly 
discourage payment and encourage default, other things equal.  The program that the students 
pursued does not seem to have a strong influence on payment or default.  None of the 
coefficients in the full sample estimates are significant.  The evaluation survey suggests that 
individuals who enrolled in a First Step or FAST TRACK program are more likely to be in 
default, and MTI and ITC students are more likely to repay than students who took the remedial 
programs only. 
 
Average quarterly earnings have a strong positive effect on payment and a strong 
negative effect on default in the full sample.  Furthermore, they have a strong positive effect on 
payment in the evaluation design, but their impact on defaults is of the wrong sign and not 
significant in Table 4.5.  In that table, students’ debts are shown to be positively related to 
defaults; but other than that result the other postprogram characteristics—family status and 
training-related placements do not have statistically significant effects on payment or default. 
SUMMARY 
 The multivariate analyses shed light on the hypotheses that were stated in the 
introductory chapter.  Specifically, we found the following: 
 
H1: Loan repayment performance will not vary by demographic characteristics of 
program applicants such as race, sex, or age. 
 
                                                 
10 Because of collinearity, the African-American variable was not included in the default models using the 
evaluation survey data. 
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 This hypothesis is not confirmed.  Both age and being an African American were shown 
to reduce the likelihood of repayment and to reduce the amount of repayment.  Gender did not 
seem to have an effect on repayment behavior, however. 
 
H2: Loan repayment performance will differ for individuals with and without a 
cosigner.  Cosigners will increase the likelihood of more positive outcomes. 
 
 This hypothesis was confirmed.  Having a cosigner increased the likelihood of repayment 
and the amount of repayment.  It decreased the likelihood of default in the analyses of the 
evaluation survey data, although it increased the likelihood of default in the full sample. 
 
H3: Loan repayment performance will be lower for individuals who had been 
incarcerated prior to program application. 
 
 The small number of observations in which an individual identified themselves as having 
a felony made it difficult to reach statistically significant findings, but the signs of the effects 
seem to confirm this hypothesis.  Having been a felon significantly reduced the amount of 
repayments and increased the likelihood of default. 
 
H4: Loan repayment performance will be better for individuals who completed all of 
the courses that they began.  Stated conversely, loan repayment performance will 
lag for individuals who did not complete a course in which they enrolled. 
 
 In general, this hypothesis was confirmed.  One of the strongest explanatory variables in 
the loan repayment behavior models was the existence of a noncompleted course.  This factor 
reduced the likelihood of repayment, increased the likelihood of default, and reduced 
significantly the total amount of repayments if such repayments had begun.  The number of 
completed courses had a strong effect on payment status and default status, increasing the former 
and decreasing the latter.  But the number of completed courses did not have a statistically 
significant effect on the amount of repayments. 
 
H5: Loan repayment performance will differ for individuals who enroll in First Step or 
FAST TRACK from individuals who don’t.  The former will have lower 
performance. 
 
 This hypothesis was not confirmed.  In general, students who had enrolled in First Step or 
FAST TRACK were estimated to have quite similar repayment behavior as those students who 
had not.  There was (weak) evidence that these students may have a slightly higher default 
likelihood, and that both MTI and ITC students had slightly higher payment likelihoods. 
 
H6: Loan repayment performance will not differ between MTI and ITC students. 
 
 This hypothesis was confirmed.  Both types of students had quite similar estimated 
parameters with respect to payment and default.  ITC students had slightly higher levels of total 
repayments, holding other things equal. 
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H7: Loan repayment performance will not vary by the size of the student 
responsibility. 
 
 This hypothesis was not confirmed by the empirical evidence.  The size of the loan is a 
strong predictor of payment or default; however, it did not seem to have a strong effect on the 
amount of repayments.  The empirical results indicate that larger loans clearly discourage 
payment and encourage default, other things equal.   
 
H8: Loan repayment performance will differ across the marital and family status of 
applicants.  The presence of a spouse or own children will increase the likelihood 
of more positive outcomes. 
 
 This hypothesis was not confirmed.  Family status did not have a statistically significant 
effect on repayment or default. 
 
H9: The strongest correlates of repayment behavior will be employment and earnings 
subsequent to attending Focus: HOPE.  Higher levels of employment and earnings 
will be associated with higher levels of repayment. 
 
 Indeed, average earnings from the wage record data was strongly related to all of the 
repayment measures.  We estimated that each additional $1.00 in average quarterly earnings 
resulted in $0.13 to $0.19 additional repayments.  Furthermore, average earnings increased the 
likelihood of making a payment.  A puzzle is that average earnings is also correlated with 
default, although this relationship is not statistically significant.   
 
H10: Individuals with a training-related placement will have higher levels of 
repayment. 
 
 This hypothesis was not confirmed.  The training-relatedness of individuals’ jobs was not 
related to any of the repayment behaviors. 
 
H11: Loan repayment behavior will depend on the debt burden of program 
completers/leavers.  Debt burden will be inversely related to repayment behavior. 
 
 We were not able to strongly confirm this hypothesis.  Total debt was not significantly 
related to total payments against loan principal.  It was a weak negative correlate of payment 
status, but it significantly increased the likelihood of a loan default. 
 
 In all, we have fairly consistent and sensible results concerning the relationships between 
observable characteristics and repayment behavior.  However, it should be borne in mind that 
these statistical models explained only a small share of the variance in the data, which implies 
that nonobservable characteristics may be far more important than observables. 
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V.  TRAINING NET IMPACTS 
The evaluation data set uses individuals as the unit of observation.  For each individual in 
the treatment cohorts, the data base is populated with information from three time periods: 
Preenrollment, Focus: HOPE program participation, and posttraining.  The individuals in the 
comparison cohorts have data from preencounter and postencounter time periods.  Some 
variables are time-invariant, and others change over time.  
 
The data blocks that are in the preenrollment (for treatment cohort members) and 
preencounter (for comparison cohort members) periods of time include demographics, 
information about childhood family(ies), high school(s) experiences, postsecondary educational 
experiences prior to encountering Focus: HOPE, current family status and relationships, 
health/disability status, sources and amounts of income. 
 
The Focus: HOPE participation data for treatment cohort members include academic 
information about courses taken, completion, and financial aid information.  The financial aid 
information includes application information, student account balances, and repayment/deferral 
histories.   
 
The data blocks in the posttraining (postencounter) periods include employment-related 
information (occupation, wage rate, hours, availability of insurance, training, etc.), current 
family(ies) information, further education or training, health status, and sources and amounts of 
income. 
LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES 
The gist of the net impact analyses is to determine the difference in outcomes between 
individuals who received Focus: HOPE training and the comparison group members.  Because 
individuals were not randomly assigned to be in the participant group or in the comparison 
group, there may be systematic (nonrandom) differences between them.  The statistical 
estimators used to calculate the net impact analyses attempt to control for those differences in 
order to get an unbiased estimate of the training’s net impact.   
 
We have used two data sources to estimate net impacts.  First, we used the quarterly 
earnings data from the Unemployment Insurance wage record data system, and second, we used 
self-reported data from the sample survey. 
Wage Record Data Results 
 Employers in Michigan are required to submit quarterly earnings records when they pay 
their Unemployment Insurance taxes.  Applicants to Focus: HOPE have been requested to sign a 
form that allows the state to disclose these records to Focus: HOPE for programmatic and 
evaluation purposes.  For the evaluation, the social security numbers of all the individuals in the 
analysis data base were sent to the state for earnings records matching.  Because of strict 
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disclosure regulations, the state also used the first initial of the individuals’ first names as a 
secondary match criterion.   
Employment  
 The first outcome to be examined is employment rates.  In this case, employment is 
defined as having positive earnings in a quarter.  The employment rate is employment as a 
percentage of the total sample.11  The last two columns of Table 5.1 provide data on employment 
rates for the individuals who enrolled in 2002–2004 and for the comparison group of individuals 
who tested to become students in 2002–2004.  As a benchmark, the first column of data show the 
employment rates for cohort 0 students (enrolled prior to 2002). 
 
Table 5.1  Employment Rates, by Group and Quarter 
Quarter Cohort 0 (%) Treatment: Cohorts 1–4 (%) Comparison group (%) 
2002:Q1 52.4a,b 44.8c 47.8 
2002:Q2 54.7a,b 48.3c 50.1 
2002:Q3 54.6a,b 47.3c 49.7 
2002:Q4 49.0a,b 44.9 45.0 
2003:Q1 32.6 33.7 34.2 
2003:Q2 54.8a,b 42.0 42.1 
2003:Q3 43.1a,b 32.7 34.3 
2003:Q4 57.8a,b 51.8 49.6 
2004:Q1 54.5a,b 49.8c 46.9 
2004:Q2 53.4a,b 49.2 47.9 
2004:Q3 57.2a,b 54.2c 50.4 
2004:Q4 56.1b 53.2c 49.7 
2005:Q1 55.7b 53.9c 49.3 
2005:Q2 55.3b 53.0c 48.0 
2005:Q3 na 55.2c 48.6 
2005:Q4 na 55.1c 47.8 
2006:Q1 na 53.1c 45.3 
2006:Q2 na 47.6c 42.0 
NOTE:  The dashed line indicates the point in time in which the treatment groups’ employment rate surpassed the 
comparison groups’.  na means data not available.   
aCohort 0 statistically significantly different from treatment. 
bCohort 0 statistically significantly different from comparison group.  
cTreatment statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
 
 Some interesting characteristics about the data in the table should be noted. First, all three 
groups experienced the employment cycle in parallel. Employment rates started to drop in the 
4th quarter of 2002 and were abysmal through 2003:Q3, with the exception of the 2nd quarter, 
which may have reflected summer employment. The employment rates rebounded substantially 
in 2004. Second, note that the treatment and comparison groups’ employment rates were quite 
                                                 
11 The employment rates that are reported are underestimates of the “true” rate.  Because of erroneous 
social security numbers, the wage record match missed a significant number of individuals.  The match rates that 
were achieved were approximately 75 percent.  The nonmatches would be individuals not employed, individuals 
who were employed out of state, and individuals who were employed but whose erroneous data prevented a match.  
A “guesstimate” is that the employment rates reported here are underestimated by about 10 percentage points.  That 
would yield rates that approximate the rates that are self-reported in the evaluation survey. 
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lower than the cohort 0 rates in the earliest quarters displayed, but then they become much closer 
toward the end of the data. This likely reflects the fact that the treatment and comparison groups 
are younger and have less labor market experience. Finally, note that the treatment group 
surpasses the comparison group for the final 11 quarters of data. We have inserted a dashed line 
to indicate this phenomenon. During these 11 quarters, the employment differential favoring the 
Focus: HOPE students averaged 4.60 percentage points, which is almost a 10 percent effect. 
 Disaggregation of the employment impact   
 Of course, a characteristic of the treatment group is that a significant share of the 
individuals are students, which may dilute their employment rates. Table 5.2 displays the 
employment rate data for the treatment group disaggregated by whether the individual was 
enrolled in Focus: HOPE during the quarter as well as the comparison group. Here, the 
employment rate for nonenrolled individuals exceeds the comparison group’s employment rate 
for virtually the entire period, whereas the enrolled students’ employment rate is less than the 
comparison group’s for virtually every quarter, except for the last three quarters. (Of course, it 
should be recognized that some of the comparison group members may be students at other 
training institutions during the period.) Over the entire 18-quarter period presented in the table, 
the treatment students not enrolled have a 3.8 percentage point higher employment rate on 
average than the comparison group. This is a positive net impact of approximately 8 to 10 
percent. 
 
Table 5.2  Employment Rates by Whether Treatment Groups Students are Enrolled, by 
Quarter 
Treatment cohorts 1–4: 
Quarter Enrolled students (%) Nonenrolled (%) Comparison group (%) 
2002:Q1 40.3a,b 46.3 47.8 
2002:Q2 42.0a,b 51.3 50.1 
2002:Q3 42.4a,b 50.6 49.7 
2002:Q4 40.9 47.3 45.0 
2003:Q1 27.7a,b 37.7 34.2 
2003:Q2 42.3 41.9 42.1 
2003:Q3 28.1a,b 34.4 34.3 
2003:Q4 45.2a 53.9c 49.6 
2004:Q1 42.9a 52.2c 46.9 
2004:Q2 40.7a,b 51.8c 47.9 
2004:Q3 49.3a 55.7c 50.4 
2004:Q4 47.4a 54.6c 49.7 
2005:Q1 48.4a 54.8c 49.3 
2005:Q2 47.9 53.6c 48.0 
2005:Q3 59.1 54.8c 48.6 
2005:Q4 58.2b 54.9c 47.8 
2006:Q1 — 53.2c 45.3 
2006:Q2 — 47.7c 42.0 
NOTE:  The dashed line indicates the point in time in which the nonenrolled treatment group’s employment rate 
surpassed the comparison groups’.  — indicates sample size too small to be meaningful.  
aEnrolled students statistically significantly different from nonenrolled. 
bEnrolled students statistically significantly different from comparison group.  
cNonenrolled students statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
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 Clearly, another interesting way to look at the employment rate outcome is by type.  The 
Focus: HOPE training leads to higher employment rates, but the question might be asked about 
whether this positive outcome is equally distributed across the MTI or ITC students or students 
who did not proceed beyond First Step or FAST TRACK.  Table 5.3 shows the employment 
rates disaggregated by course type.  Several interesting findings stand out.  First, the ITC 
employment rates are higher than the MTI rates for the first 13 quarters but then they are almost 
identical for the remainder of the analysis period.  Second, both ITC and MTI employment rates 
are higher than the employment rates for the students who enrolled in First Step or FAST 
TRACK, but did not go on, and they are higher than the comparison group’s employment rate.   
 
Table 5.3  Employment Rates by Course Type, by Quarter 
Quarter FS/FT only MTI ITC Comparison group 
2002:Q1 37.2b,c 39.2d,e 54.5 47.8 
2002:Q2 44.3b,c 43.9d,e 55.1 50.1 
2002:Q3 43.1b,c 41.6d,e 55.3 49.7 
2002:Q4 41.2b 39.6d,e 52.6f 45.0 
2003:Q1 30.8b 30.6d,e 38.4 34.2 
2003:Q2 37.9b 38.2d,e 53.4f 42.1 
2003:Q3 27.0b,c 31.9d 40.2f 34.3 
2003:Q4 47.2b 52.3d 57.3f 49.6 
2004:Q1 46.5b 48.7d 55.6f 46.9 
2004:Q2 46.0b 48.1d 55.9f 47.9 
2004:Q3 50.3b 53.1d 62.3f 50.4 
2004:Q4 48.5a,b 55.0e 56.6f 49.7 
2005:Q1 48.8a,b 55.4.e 58.4f 49.3 
2005:Q2 48.5a,b 55.8 e 55.9f 48.0 
2005:Q3 50.1a,b 57.2e 57.9f 48.6 
2005:Q4 47.6a,b 58.4e 57.9f 47.8 
2006:Q1 46.7a,b 55.1e 56.8f 45.3 
2006:Q2 42.6a,b 49.2e 50.4f 42.0 
NOTE:  Table entries are percentages. 
aFS/FT only  statistically significantly different from MTI.  
bFS/FT only statistically significantly different from ITC.  
cFS/FT only statistically significantly different from comparison group.  
dMTI statistically significantly different from ITC.  
eMTI statistically significantly different from comparison group.  
fITC statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
 
 Third, the employment rates of the First Step and FAST TRACK only students lag 
behind the comparison group for the first eight quarters, but then are virtually the same.  This 
result is suggestive of a positive impact of those courses on the employability of students, even if 
the students do not proceed into the MTI or ITC.  Only students who tested below a 9th grade 
level were required to take First Step or FAST TRACK.  So all of those students had reading or 
math skill deficiencies.  Some of the comparison group members had comparable test scores 
(i.e., skill deficiencies); however, many of them did not.  Nevertheless, the employment rates of 
the two groups are virtually the same over the last 10 quarters of data. 
 
 In Table 5.4, we show data that address the second hypothesis about training impacts.  
Here the treatment group is split into individuals who had at least one course that they did not 
complete and individuals without any incomplete courses.  As would be expected, the students 
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without any incompletes have higher employment rates than the comparison group or the 
students who had at least one incomplete, although the advantage did not show up until the last 
11 quarters of data.  Interestingly, the students with at least one incomplete also surpass the 
comparison group in the final 11 quarters of data, although the differential is much smaller than 
for individuals with no incompletes.  
 
Table 5.4  Employment Rates by Whether Students Had an Incomplete Course, by Quarter 
Treatment cohorts 1–4: 
Quarter At least one incomplete No courses incomplete Comparison group 
2002:Q1 43.4 41.7c 47.8 
2002:Q2 46.1 46.5 50.1 
2002:Q3 45.3 45.6 49.7 
2002:Q4 43.7 42.7 45.0 
2003:Q1 33.0 31.6 34.2 
2003:Q2 39.7a 44.3 42.1 
2003:Q3 32.1 33.4 34.3 
2003:Q4 51.0 52.7 49.6 
2004:Q1 48.4 51.1c 46.9 
2004:Q2 46.5a 52.0c 47.9 
2004:Q3 50.8a 57.7c 50.4 
2004:Q4 50.5a 56.1c 49.7 
2005:Q1 51.2a 56.6c 49.3 
2005:Q2 49.6a 56.4c 48.0 
2005:Q3 51.4a 59.1c 48.6 
2005:Q4 52.5a,b 57.7c 47.8 
2006:Q1 49.9a,b 56.4c 45.3 
2006:Q2 43.9a 51.3c 42.0 
NOTE:  Table entries are percentages.  The dashed line indicates the point in time in which the employment rate for 
individuals in the treatment group without an incompleted course surpassed the comparison group’s.   
aAt least one incomplete statistically significantly different from no courses incomplete. 
bAt least one incomplete statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
cNo courses incomplete statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
 
 Another way to examine the data is to look at “successful” students versus the rest of the 
sample. Table 5.5 shows the employment rates for individuals who enrolled in MTI courses and 
completed at least Core 1, individuals who enrolled in ITC courses and completed Network 
Administration or Desktop Support, and all other students. Again, we see this pattern of MTI 
students lagging behind ITC students for the first several quarters, and then they end up on a par 
with or exceeding them for the most recent data.  
Earnings 
 The second data item from the earnings records that is analyzed is average quarterly 
earnings.  The data in Table 5.6 display this information for the entire sample.  Like the 
employment rate data, the treatment group does eventually surpass the comparison group, 
although this does not occur until the 17th quarter, i.e. the 1st quarter of 2006.  During the first 
16 quarters, the comparison group’s mean quarterly earnings is a little over $4,000 and the 
treatment group’s mean is about $3,625, which is about a 10 percent disadvantage.  Neither the 
treatment nor comparison group’s means come close to the benchmark of the cohort 0’s earning.  
They average about $5,200.   
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Table 5.5  Employment Rates by Successful Completer Status, by Quarter 
Quarter ITC successful completer MTI successful completer All other students  Comparison group 
2002:Q1 56.3a,b 39.2e 42.6f 47.8 
2002:Q2 59.3a,b 42.6e 46.6f 50.1 
2002:Q3 58.8a,b 42.6e 45.1f 49.7 
2002:Q4 52.8a 35.8d,e 44.5 45.0 
2003:Q1 36.7a 26.1e 34.0 34.2 
2003:Q2 56.2a,b,c 41.8 40.9 42.1 
2003:Q3 38.8 34.4 32.3 34.3 
2003:Q4 58.7c 61.5d,e 50.0 49.6 
2004:Q1 57.9b,c 58.6d,e 47.6 46.9 
2004:Q2 60.3b,c 60.7d,e 46.5 47.9 
2004:Q3 69.4b,c 62.3d,e 51.7 50.4 
2004:Q4 61.6b,c 64.3d,e 50.8 49.7 
2005:Q1 64.0b,c 66.4d,e 51.1 49.3 
2005:Q2 65.3b,c 67.2d,e 49.8 48.0 
2005:Q3 68.2b,c 69.3d,e 51.1 48.6 
2005:Q4 67.4b,c 71.3d,e 50.8f 47.8 
2006:Q1 66.5b,c 70.9d,e 48.3f 45.3 
2006:Q2 61.6b,c 62.3d,e 43.1 42.0 
NOTE:  Table entries are percentages.  ITC successful completer defined as completed Network Administration or 
Desktop Support; MTI successful completer defined as completed Core 1. 
aITC successful completer statistically significantly different from MTI successful completer. 
b ITC successful completer statistically significantly different from all other students. 
c ITC successful completer statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
dMTI successful completer statistically significantly different from all other students. 
eMTI successful completer statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
 fAll other students statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
 
Table 5.6  Quarterly Earnings, by Group and by Quarter 
Quarter Cohort 0 ($) Treatment cohorts 1–4 ($) Comparison group ($) 
2002:Q1 4,211a,b 2,993 3,244 
2002:Q2 4,520a,b 3,021c 3,481 
2002:Q3 4,854a,b 3,014 c 3,391 
2002:Q4 4,925a,b 3,121c 3,535 
2003:Q1 4,463a,b 2,788c 3,357 
2003:Q2 5,149a,b 3,389c 3,926 
2003:Q3 5,349a,b 3,442c 4,056 
2003:Q4 5,673a,b 3,479c 4,200 
2004:Q1 5,338a,b 3,442c 3,853 
2004:Q2 5,568a,b 3,631c 3,948 
2004:Q3 5,421a,b 3,687c 4,064 
2004:Q4 6,171a,b 4,378 4,631 
2005:Q1 5,505a,b 3,944 4,195 
2005:Q2 5,802a,b 4,397 4,605 
2005:Q3 na 4,584 4,834 
2005:Q4 na 4,688 4,888 
2006:Q1 na 4,855 4,745 
2006:Q2 na 4,868 4,846 
NOTE:  The dashed line indicates the point in time in which the treatment group’s average quarterly earnings 
surpassed the comparison group’s.  na indicates data not available. 
aCohort 0 statistically significantly different from treatment. 
bcohort 0 statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
ctreatment statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
  39
 Disaggregation of the earnings net impacts 
 The next table displays the average earnings by quarter for the treatment students who are 
enrolled in a class during the quarter and those not enrolled.  As would be expected the average 
quarterly earnings for the latter are much greater, Table 5.7 shows that the mean of the average 
quarterly earnings is about $2,600 for the enrolled students and $3,950 for the nonenrolled 
individuals.  As for the treatment group as a whole, the average earnings for the treatment group 
nonstudents are less than the average earnings for the comparison group for almost the entire 
period, but then exceed them for the last two quarters.   
 
Table 5.7  Quarterly Earnings by Whether Treatment Groups Students are Enrolled, by 
Quarter 
Treatment cohorts 1–4: 
Quarter Enrolled students ($) Nonenrolled ($) Comparison group ($) 
2002:Q1 2,427a,b 3,155 3,244 
2002:Q2 2,856b 3,087 3,481 
2002:Q3 2,544a,b 3,278 3,391 
2002:Q4 2,956b 3,203 3,535 
2003:Q1 2,746 2,808c 3,357 
2003:Q2 2,903a,b 3,572c 3,926 
2003:Q3 2,482a,b 3,729 4,056 
2003:Q4 2,365a,b 3,769 4,200 
2004:Q1 2,598a,b 3,691 3,853 
2004:Q2 2,477a,b 3,910 3,948 
2004:Q3 2,363a,b 4,043 4,064 
2004:Q4 2,748a,b 4,716 4,631 
2005:Q1 3,478a,b 4,169 4,195 
2005:Q2 2,573a,b 4,602 4,605 
2005:Q3 2,645a,b 4,784 4,834 
2005:Q4 2,565a,b 4,798 4,888 
2006:Q1 — 4,886 4,745 
2006:Q2 — 4,869 4,846 
NOTE:  The dashed line indicates the point in time in which the nonenrolled individual’s average quarterly earnings 
surpassed the comparison group’s.  — indicates cell size is too small to be meaningful.   
aEnrolled students statistically significantly different from nonenrolled. 
bEnrolled students statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
cNonenrolled students statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
 
 Table 5.8 shows the earnings impact by course type. Here we see considerable 
differentials between the course types. The ITC students’ average quarterly earnings are 
approximately $1,000 per quarter higher than the MTI students, which translates to be about 25 
percent. In the early quarters of the time series, the MTI students’ earnings are $200 to $500 
greater than the First Step/FAST TRACK only students’ earnings. But then this differential 
grows considerably. By the last few quarters the MTI students are earning almost $1,000 per 
quarter than are the First Step/FAST TRACK only students.   
 
 In Table 5.9, we array quarterly earnings by whether the students had an incomplete 
class. In the first few quarters, individuals with an incomplete class actually average higher 
quarterly earnings than those without an incomplete. A likely explanation for this is that the  
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Table 5.8  Quarterly Earnings by Course Type, by Quarter 
Quarter FS/FT only ($) MTI ($) ITC ($)  Comparison group ($) 
2002:Q1 2,171b,c 2,549d,e 3,796f 3,244 
2002:Q2 2,429b,c 2,405d,e 3,909 3,481 
2002:Q3 2,405b,c 2,477d,e 3,836 3,391 
2002:Q4 2,454b,c 2,627d,e 3,906 3,535 
2003:Q1 2,026b,c 2,486d,e 3,481 3,357 
2003:Q2 2,819b,c 3,043d,e 3,995 3,926 
2003:Q3 2,808b,c 3,102d,e 4,105 4,056 
2003:Q4 2,688b,c 3,033d,e 4,500 4,200 
2004:Q1 2,491a,b,c 3,213d,e 4,391f 3,853 
2004:Q2 2,668a,b,c 3,495d,e 4,464f 3,948 
2004:Q3 2,958a,b,c 3,599d,e 4,340f 4,064 
2004:Q4 3,432a,b,c 4,249d,e 5,418f 4,631 
2005:Q1 3,032a,b,c 3,893d 4,801f 4,195 
2005:Q2 3,688a,b,c 4,303d 5,248f 4,605 
2005:Q3 3,837a,b,c 4,506d 5,503f 4,834 
2005:Q4 4,007a,b,c 4,636d 5,437f 4,888 
2006:Q1 3,885a,b,c 4,515d 6,078f 4,745 
2006:Q2 3,716a,b,c 4,866d 5,742f 4,846 
NOTE:  The dashed line indicates the point in time in which the treatment group’s average quarterly earnings 
surpassed the comparison group’s.   
aFS/FT only statistically significantly different from MTI. 
bFS/FT only statistically significantly different from ITC. 
cFS/FT only statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
dMTI statistically significantly different from ITC. 
eMTI statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
 fITC statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
 
Table 5.9  Quarterly Earnings by Whether Students Had an Incomplete Course, by 
Quarter 
Treatment cohorts 1–4: 
Quarter At least one incomplete ($) No courses incomplete ($) Comparison group ($) 
2002:Q1 2,652a,b 3,296 3,244 
2002:Q2 2,861b 3,141 3,481 
2002:Q3 2,877b 3,148 3,391 
2002:Q4 3,123 3,085c 3,535 
2003:Q1 3,007 2,643c 3,357 
2003:Q2 3,493b 3,294c 3,926 
2003:Q3 3,613b 3,274c 4,056 
2003:Q4 3,428b 3,529c 4,200 
2004:Q1 3,338b 3,543 3,853 
2004:Q2 3,719 3,551c 3,948 
2004:Q3 3,626b 3,742 4,064 
2004:Q4 4,269 4,478 4,631 
2005:Q1 3,762b 4,112 4,195 
2005:Q2 4,225 4,550 4,605 
2005:Q3 4,469 4,686 4,834 
2005:Q4 4,538 4,827 4,888 
2006:Q1 4,826 4,882 4,745 
2006:Q2 4,742 4,977 4,846 
NOTE:  The dashed line indicates the point in time in which the treatment group’s average quarterly earnings 
surpassed the comparison group’s.   
aAt least one incomplete statistically significantly different from no courses incomplete. 
bAt least one incomplete statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
cNo courses incomplete statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
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individuals with an incomplete may have taken a full-time job, whereas the individuals without 
an incomplete may still be enrolled students. However, after the seventh quarter, the average 
earnings for individuals without an incomplete exceed the average earnings for those with an 
incomplete for the remainder of the time series.   
 
 The last disaggregation of the earnings data appears in Table 5.10, which shows average 
quarterly earnings by successful completion status.  The successful completers from the ITC 
have a significant earnings advantage over the successful MTI completers, all other students, and 
the comparison group through most of the time period.  Starting in 2004, their average quarterly 
earnings exceed the comparison group’s average quarterly earnings by $500 to $1,000.  For the 
first 11 quarters, the successful MTI completer’s average earnings do not keep pace with the 
comparison group’s.  However, over the last 7 quarters, they do exceed the comparison, and even 
go past the ITC group in the final quarter.   
 
Table 5.10  Quarterly Earnings by Successful Completer Status, by Quarter 
Quarter 
ITC successful 
completer ($) 
MTI successful 
completer ($) All other students ($) 
Comparison group 
($) 
2002:Q1 4,446a,b,c 2,639 2,692f 3,244 
2002:Q2 4,159a,b 2,549 2,801f 3,481 
2002:Q3 4,067a,b,c 2,426e 2,853f 3,391 
2002:Q4 3,925a,b 2,719 2,984f 3,535 
2003:Q1 3,091 2,372 2,778f 3,357 
2003:Q2 3,644 3,061e 3,370f 3,926 
2003:Q3 3,851a 2,642d,e 3,497f 4,056 
2003:Q4 4,421a,b 3,036e 3,374f 4,200 
2004:Q1 4,382a,b 3,481 3,278f 3,853 
2004:Q2 4,131b 3,830 3,518f 3,948 
2004:Q3 4,168b 4,088d 3,549f 4,064 
2004:Q4 4,938b 4,938d 4,264f 4,631 
2005:Q1 4,757b 4,664d 3,713f 4,195 
2005:Q2 5,037b 4,949d 4,249f 4,605 
2005:Q3 5,425b 5,088d 4,432f 4,834 
2005:Q4 5,540b 5,500d 4,418f 4,888 
2006:Q1 5,858b,c 5,401e 4,563 4,745 
2006:Q2 5,720b,c 6,039d,e 4,431f 4,846 
NOTE:  The dashed line indicates the point in time in which the treatment group’s average quarterly earnings 
surpassed the comparison group’s.  ITC Successful Completer defined as completed Network Administration or 
Desktop Support; MTI Successful Completer defined as completed Core 1.  
aITC Successful Completer statistically significantly different from MTI Successful Completer. 
bITC Successful Completer statistically significantly different from all other students. 
cITC Successful Completer statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
dMTI Successful Completer statistically significantly different from all other students. 
eMTI Successful Completer statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
fAll other students statistically significantly different from comparison group. 
Sample Survey Data 
 The second source of data for the training net impact analysis is sample surveys that were 
conducted in March/April 2004, April/May 2005, and Spring/Summer 2006.  These surveys 
were conducted by a survey unit of Wayne State University.  The sampling frames for the 
surveys were confined to the students or comparison group members in cohorts 1 through 3.  The 
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first survey obtained 460 usable responses, equally split between the treatment and comparison 
groups.  The second survey obtained 700 responses; of which 360 were from the comparison 
group and 340 from the treatment group of students.  The third wave of the survey obtained 645 
responses, of which 310 were from the treatment group.   
 Response rates and response analyses 
 Response rates to these surveys were quite low. It was exceedingly difficult to get 
responses to this telephone survey.  To enhance response rates, we offered all individuals who 
completed the survey a gift card at Target ($10 for the first survey and $15 for the second and 
third).  The Upjohn Institute supplied Wayne State with lists of the students sampled randomly 
that had the most recent contact information for the students as supplied to us by Focus: HOPE.  
 
 In the first wave of the survey, the response rate for the treatment group (first-time 
enrollees in 2002 and 2003) was about 17.0 percent.  It was 11.8 percent for the comparison 
group.  Most of the nonresponse came from bad telephone numbers (disconnected/not in service 
or wrong numbers) as opposed to refusals.  In the second wave of the survey, the response rate 
for the treatment group, which now included the 2004 students was 18.3 percent, and the 
response rate for the comparison group was 12.8 percent.  In the third wave of the survey, which 
had the same population as the second wave, the response rates were 16.7 percent and 11.9 
percent for the treatment and comparison groups, respectively.   
 
 With such poor response rates, the question of potential bias is natural.  We were able to 
analyze nonresponse using a couple of different statistics, and as a result, we don’t believe that 
response bias is of a significant magnitude.  Table 5.11 presents data on the application test 
scores for the total population and for the survey respondents, and data on self-reported 
employment rates of the respondents and the appropriate quarterly employment rate from the 
total population that got matched to wage records.  The survey respondents average slightly 
higher on the test scores than does the entire population; however, this is true for both the 
treatment and comparison groups, and the differences are quite small. 
 
Table 5.11  Survey Response Analysis 
Survey respondents Population 
Statistic Comparison Treatment Comparison Treatment 
Test scoresa 
     Math 
     Reading 
 
9.5 
11.3 
 
10.0 
11.7 
 
9.3 
11.2 
 
9.9 
11.5 
Employment ratesb 
     Q2:2004 
     Q1:2005 
     Q2:2006 
 
54.8 
58.3 
62.6 
 
55.2 
58.3 
63.2 
 
47.9 
49.3 
42.0 
 
49.2 
53.9 
47.6 
aIf individual was retested, the highest score was used. 
bSurvey respondents’ data pertain to current employment status on date of survey; population rates determined from 
wage record data.  Population employment rates are biased downward because of mismatches between the student 
data and the UI wage record data. 
 
 The self-reported current employment rates are higher than the administrative quarterly 
rates. For the treatment group, the former is about 5 percentage points greater in the first two 
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waves of the survey, but then it jumps to more that 15 percentage points in the third wave. For 
the comparison group, the difference is about 7 to 8 percentage points in the first two waves, but 
then balloons to 20 percentage points in the third wave.  Given the data problems that caused the 
matching to the UI wage records to underestimate employment, it is likely that the “true” 
population employment rates are greater than the survey rates in the first two waves, but may be 
less than the survey rates in the third wave. In other words, the survey may have 
underrepresented employed individuals in Waves 1 and 2, and overrepresented them in Wave 3. 
However, the statistics do not suggest a differential bias between the treatment and comparison 
groups.   
 Demographic and educational characteristics 
 Table 5.12 provides descriptive statistics from the three waves of the survey concerning 
the demographics of the treatment and comparison groups of individuals.  If we assume that 
there is no response bias in the survey, the table suggests that the average treatment group  
 
Table 5.12  Descriptive Statistics about Demographics, by Survey Wave 
2004 Survey 2005 Survey 2006 Survey 
Characteristic Treatment Comparison Treatment Comparison Treatment Comparison
Sample size 230 230 340 360 307 340 
Sex (%) 
     Male 
     Female 
 
65.7 
34.3 
 
65.7 
34.3 
 
67.6 
32.4 
 
62.8 
37.2 
 
66.8 
33.2 
 
67.7 
32.3 
Age at testing (mean) 28.3 30.1 28.4 29.0 31.1 33.8 
Race/ethnic origin (%) 
     Black/African American 
     White/Caucasian 
     Latino/Hispanic 
     Other (incl. mixed, DK, Ref.) 
 
90.0 
2.2 
2.6 
5.2 
 
86.5 
4.8 
3.5 
5.2 
 
88.8 
3.2 
2.2 
5.8 
 
88.6 
5.6 
1.1 
4.9 
 
93.1 
3.0 
1.3 
2.3 
 
84.3 
7.4 
2.7 
5.6 
Childhood household (%) 
     Number of adults < 2 
     Number of children ≥ 4 
 
28.5 
29.4 
 
26.4 
30.2 
 
26.8 
34.9 
 
23.3 
31.3 
 
22.6a 
40.3a 
 
24.0a 
39.5a 
Mobility in childhood (%) 
     Never moved 
     Moved once/twice 
     Moved 3+ times 
 
29.2 
45.4 
25.4 
 
27.2 
45.6 
27.2 
 
25.0 
48.8 
26.2 
 
30.1 
42.0 
27.9 
 
33.0a 
46.8a 
20.2a 
 
28.1a 
40.7a 
31.1a 
Education of mother/female 
Guardian (%) 
     Less than high school 
     High school or GED 
     Some college 
     College degree or more 
 
 
8.8 
33.0 
28.9 
29.3 
 
 
14.3 
35.0 
29.9 
20.8 
 
 
12.1 
29.1 
28.8 
30.0 
 
 
12.1 
34.6 
29.4 
23.9 
 
 
10.5 
30.9 
29.5 
29.2 
 
 
9.7 
39.8 
24.3 
25.5 
Education of father/male 
Guardian (%) 
     Less than high school 
     High school or GED 
     Some college 
     College degree or more 
 
 
14.1 
39.3 
27.4 
19.2 
 
 
18.3 
44.3 
18.7 
18.7 
 
 
14.7 
38.8 
22.4 
24.1 
 
 
17.9 
45.2 
23.0 
13.9 
 
 
12.7 
55.4 
8.5 
23.5 
 
 
19.8 
46.3 
18.0 
15.9 
aQuestions were not repeated in Wave 3, so these statistics are applicable only to Wave 3 respondents who happen to 
be in earlier waves of the survey. 
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member is slightly more likely to be a male, slightly younger, and slightly less likely to be 
White/Caucasian than the typical comparison group member.  The comparison group members 
are individuals who tested high enough to get into Focus: HOPE, but chose not to enroll.  The 
table’s statistics suggest that these individuals are slightly more likely to be female, older, and 
White/Caucasian.   
 
 The average treatment group member is slightly more likely to have come from a 
childhood home with a single parent, but the two groups seem to be indistinguishable in terms of 
number of children in the home and mobility.  Finally, the treatment group seems to come from 
families with higher levels of parental education.  The percentage of students with mother’s or 
father’s educational attainment to be high school diploma or less is much smaller for the Focus: 
HOPE students than for the comparison group, and the percentage with college or more is 
higher. 
 
 Table 5.13 has descriptive statistics concerning the educational backgrounds of the 
treatment and comparison groups.  The self-reported high school grade point average (GPA) of 
the treatment group is lower than that of the comparison group respondents—this is consistent 
with the higher proportion of males.  Also, not surprisingly, the comparison group seems to have 
slightly higher likelihoods of attending a college after high school and of participating in formal 
skill training other than at a college setting.  These differences may be explained by the fact that 
the questions ask the respondents about post–high school education and training other than at 
Focus: HOPE. 
 
Table 5.13  Descriptive Statistics about High School GPA and Post–High School Formal 
Education or Training, by Survey Wave 
2004 Survey 2005 Survey 2006 Survey 
Characteristic Treatment Comparison Treatment Comparison Treatment Comparison 
High school GPA (self-reported) 2.69 2.81 2.73 2.79 2.77 a 2.80 a 
Attended community college, 
college, or university (%) 
62.6 61.3 58.8 67.5 66.1 72.4 
Formal skill training, other than 
community college, college, 
university, or Focus: HOPE (%) 
30.9 35.7 54.7 55.0 27.8 39.1 
aQuestions were not repeated in Wave 3, so these statistics are applicable only to Wave 3 respondents who happen to 
be in earlier waves of the survey. 
 Reasons for choosing not to attend Focus: HOPE12 
 One of the purposes of the evaluation survey was to ask comparison group members 
about why they chose not to enroll in Focus: HOPE.  Table 5.14 provides these data along with 
information about the application process.  The top panel of the table shows that about half the 
respondents indicated that they were interested in MTI and a slightly smaller percentage was 
interested in ITC.  Most of the applicants had completed a tour and orientation session.  About 
half of the comparison group respondents to the first wave and about one-third of the 
respondents to the second wave indicated that they had taken a drug test.  
                                                 
12 The questions about reasons for not attending Focus: HOPE were not asked in the third wave of the 
evaluation survey.  This section is repeated from Hollenbeck and DeRango (2005). 
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Table 5.14  Comparison Group Interactions with Focus: HOPE, by Survey Wave 
 2004 Survey 2005 Survey 
Program of application (%) 
     MTI 
     ITC 
     Both 
     Other (Neither, DK, Ref.) 
 
51.3 
41.8 
3.5 
3.5 
 
50.8 
43.1 
3.1 
3.0 
Activities completed 
     Tour/orientation 
     Drug test 
     Financial aid application 
 
91.7 
48.3 
48.3 
 
93.9 
36.9 
34.7 
Reasons for not attending (%)  Mentioned Two most important 
     Not interested in that field 
     Training will take too long 
     Too expensive 
     Get education/training elsewhere 
     Didn’t want loan 
     Couldn’t get cosigner 
     Transportation difficulties 
     Got a job 
13.9 
9.2 
24.4 
25.7 
12.6 
8.7 
8.7 
27.8 
19.4 
14.0 
36.0 
37.3 
25.0 
12.5 
16.0 
36.0 
10.0 
8.2 
28.5 
22.4 
13.8 
6.8 
12.1 
25.9 
Sample size 230 360 
 
 The lower panel of the table provides responses to the question about why the individuals 
chose not to enroll.  The respondents provided multiple reasons, so the percentages in the table 
add up to more than 100 percent.  In the second wave, we asked the individuals to indicate which 
of the reasons they considered to be the most important and allowed up to two responses.  The 
reason mentioned most frequently in the first wave and second most often in the second wave 
was that the respondent “got a job.”  This was mentioned by approximately one-third of the 
respondents.  A very similar-sized share of the respondents indicated that the Focus: HOPE 
training was “too expensive” or that they decided to “get education/training elsewhere.”  
Presumably there was high overlap between these two responses. 
 
 Of particular interest to Focus: HOPE was the extent that the loan obligation might deter 
applicants.  This seemed to affect a relatively small share of the comparison group.  About 13 
percent of the first wave respondents mentioned that they “didn’t want a loan,” and about nine 
percent “couldn’t get a cosigner.”  Again, there is overlap between these two response 
categories.  In the second wave, these responses were mentioned slightly more often:  about 25 
and 13 percent of the time. 
 
 Finally, logistical problems such as transportation or length of the program were 
relatively minor, as was the response that after orientation, the respondent decided that they were 
no longer interested in the field. 
Outcomes 
 Labor market outcomes 
 
 Table 5.15 provides information from the survey about the labor market outcomes that 
occurred for the treatment and comparison groups of individuals after their training from or 
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application encounters with Focus: HOPE.  The first row of data shows the employment rates at 
the time of application.  The comparison group members had an employment rate that was six to 
eight points higher than the treatment grouping the first and last wave of the survey, but it was 
about the same for the second wave.  The higher employment rate is consistent with one of the 
most numerous mentioned reasons for not attending Focus: HOPE, which was because the 
individual had a job.   
 
Table 5.15  Labor Market Outcomes, by Survey Wave and Treatment Status 
2004 Survey 2005 Survey 2006 Survey 
Outcome Treatment Comparison Treatment Comparison Treatment Comparison 
Employed at time of application (%) 29.2 35.3 35.0 34.8 27.1a 34.8a 
Current employment status (%) 
     Employed 
     Not employed 
 
55.2 
44.8 
 
54.8 
45.2 
 
58.3 
41.7 
 
58.3 
41.7 
 
63.2 
36.8 
 
62.6 
37.4 
If currently employed, 
     Job is training-related (%) 
     Tenure (in months) 
     Hours/week 
     Hourly wage ($) 
     Received promotion? (%) 
     Health insurance? (%) 
N=127 
33.9 
11.1 
36.2 
10.93 
28.4 
40.2 
N=126 
22.3 
16.7 
39.9 
12.13 
44.5 
53.2 
N=198 
29.3 
13.2 
35.3 
10.72 
38.1 
41.2 
N=210 
20.5 
13.8 
37.3 
10.82 
37.1 
45.5 
N=197 
48.2 
15.2 
40.0 
12.10 
40.2 
64.8 
N=206 
33.0 
18.1 
39.6 
12.82 
41.4 
51.4 
If not employed, 
     Currently looking? (%) 
     Unemployment rate (%) 
     Held job in last 2 years? 
          Yes (%) 
          No (%) 
     Percent long-term unemployment (%) 
N=103 
81.5 
39.8 
 
64.1 
35.9 
16.1 
N=104 
80.8 
40.0 
 
73.1 
26.9 
12.2 
N=142 
74.7 
35.0 
 
60.8 
39.2 
16.5 
N=150 
80.7 
36.6 
 
76.0 
24.0 
10.0 
N=113 
77.0 
32.1 
 
69.9 
30.1 
12.4 
N=129 
79.8 
32.3 
 
68.2 
31.8 
13.2 
aQuestions were not repeated in Wave 3, so these statistics are applicable only to Wave 3 respondents who happen to 
be in earlier waves of the survey. 
 
 The second panel in the table displays employment and nonemployment rates of the 
samples at the time of the survey.  These data show no statistically significant differences 
between the treatment and comparison groups.  The employment rates of both groups grow over 
time—from about 55 percent in Wave 1 to about 58 percent in Wave 2 to about 63 percent in the 
most recent wave.  Individuals who responded that they were currently employed were asked a 
number of questions about their jobs.  These data items are presented next in the table.  Based on 
the individuals’ description of their job duties, occupation, and industry, we created an indicator 
of whether the job was related to their Focus: HOPE training.  The percentages are higher for the 
treatment group, although the magnitudes seem quite modest.  Slightly less than a third of the 
employed Focus: HOPE students were in a machining, manufacturing, or IT-related position in 
the first two waves.  This percentage increased to almost one-half in the third wave, however.13 
 
 Not surprisingly, the comparison group had longer tenures in their current job.  Many of 
the comparison group members chose not to attend Focus: HOPE because they had/got a job and 
                                                 
13 This concept of training-relatedness refers to the technical content of the training.  The Focus: HOPE 
training may also impart employability skills that would be germane to any occupation. 
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many of the treatment group members were taking classes when their counterparts in the 
comparison group may have been working.  Concomitantly, the hours per week and hourly wage 
of the comparison group exceeded the treatment group.  These are likely to be related to the 
longer tenures.  Interestingly, in the second and third waves of the survey, even though the 
comparison group individuals who were employed had slightly longer average tenure, their 
probability of receiving a promotion at their job was slightly lower than for the Focus: HOPE 
students.  Perhaps even more significant is the higher incidence of health insurance coverage for 
Focus: HOPE students in the third wave of the survey.  Almost two-thirds of the treatment group 
indicated that they had health insurance coverage compared to about one-half for the comparison 
group. 
 
 The final items of data in the table relate to individuals who reported that they were not 
employed at the time of the survey.  About 75–80 percent of them in both treatment and 
comparison groups reported that they were looking for employment, so the unemployment rates 
of the groups were in the range of 32–40 percent, and don’t differ by treatment or comparison 
group status.  A higher share of the Focus: HOPE students reported holding no job in the last two 
years in the first two waves of the survey, but a higher share of the comparison group reported 
not holding a job in the previous two years in the third wave.  The bottom row of the table is the 
percent of the total sample that are not working and have not held a job in the last two years.  
These percentages are in the 10–16 percent range. 
 
 Multivariate analysis of employment and wages 
 
 The analyses presented above compare employment and earnings for the treatment and 
comparison groups based on quarterly averages.  Another, perhaps more rigorous, method for 
detecting a treatment effect is through multivariate regression analysis.  In particular, the 
evaluation survey data can be used to estimate the following probit model: 
 
 (1)  EMPi = 1 if pi* > 0 
    = 0 otherwise 
 
where   pi* = a0 + A1'Yi + A2Ti + uEi 
 
   EMPi = 1 if individual i is employed (i.e., has positive earnings/ 
     wages); 0 otherwise 
   Yi = vector of characteristics describing i that are thought to be 
     related to employment  
   Ti = 1 if individual i is a “treatment”; 0 if “comparison” 
  a0, A1, A2 = parameters to be estimated by Probit 
   uEi = standard error term 
 
The parameter A2 is the treatment effect.  If it is estimated to be positive, then the employment 
likelihood for Focus: HOPE students is greater than for the comparison group. 
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 Similarly, we can estimate a wage equation to determine the net impact of being a 
treatment case.  Equation (2) presents the basic model: 
 
 (2) ln iii eTBiXBaW +++= 2
'
11  
 
where   ln Wi = (log) of hourly wage of individual i 
   X  = vector of characteristics describing individual i that are  
     thought to be related to wages  
   Ti = “treatment” dummy variable as defined above 
  a1, B1, B2 = parameters to be estimated 
   ei = standard error term 
 
Wages are only observed for employed individuals, so we address potential heterogeneity 
through the standard technique of constructing the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) term from (1) that  
will serve as a statistical correction when estimating the wage equations only for those 
individuals with observed wages (i.e., for those currently working) (Heckman 1974).  We then 
use the predicted IMR ( λˆ ) for each observation in the sample of workers in equation  
(2), resulting in equation (2’) below.17 
 (2’)   ln iiii eBBXBaW T ++++= λˆ32'11  
 Results 
 
 The econometric estimates of Equations (1) and (2’) are intended to supplement the 
employment and earnings results that we calculated by using wage record data from the 
unemployment insurance system.  Note that the outcome variables are different.  Employment is 
measured directly by asking the survey respondents whether they are employed.  In the 
discussion of employment impacts and Tables 5.1 to 5.5, employment was defined as having 
nonzero earnings in a quarter.  In the survey, we ask the individuals who indicated that they were 
employed for their current hourly wage rate. 
 
 Table 5.16 provides the signs and significance of the probit estimates of Equation (1), 
i.e., explaining employment.  The first column of entries displays the results from a specification 
with a single variable indicating that the individual was in the treatment group.  The sign of this 
treatment effect is positive, which is consistent with the tabular analyses presented above.  The 
coefficient was not statistically significant, however.  In the second specification, we replaced 
the single treatment variable with three binary variables—had taken First Step/FAST TRACK 
only, had taken MTI classes, and had taken ITC classes.  Here the sign on the First Step/FAST 
TRACK only variable was negative, whereas the signs on the other two variables were positive.  
However, again these effects were not statistically significant.   
 
                                                 
 17Variables that are included in the estimation of (1) but not (2), thus helping to identify it, include the 
mother’s education, father’s education, and family status. 
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Table 5.16  Signs and Significance of Probit Estimates of Employment Likelihood 
Characteristic Specification 1 Specification 2 
Treatment effects 
       Treatment 
       FS/FT only 
       MTI student 
       ITC student 
 
( + ) 
— 
— 
— 
 
— 
( − ) 
( + ) 
( + ) 
Demographics 
       Age 
       Male 
       African American 
 
( − ) 
( + ) 
( − ) 
 
( − ) 
(+ ) 
( − ) 
Preprogram Characteristics 
      Mother’s yrs. of educ. 
      Father’s yrs. of educ. 
      Reading test score 
      Math test score 
      Some postsecondary educ. 
 
( + ) 
( + ) 
( − ) 
( + ) 
( − ) 
 
( + ) 
( + ) 
( − ) 
( + ) 
( − ) 
Postprogram Characteristics 
       Poor health 
       Disability 
       Locus of control 
       Felon 
       Family status 
 
( − ) 
( − )*** 
( + ) 
( − )* 
( − )** 
 
( − ) 
( − )*** 
( + ) 
( − ) 
( − )** 
NOTE: Number of observations = 370; pseudo R-squared = 0.1047 for specification 1; 0.1087 for specification 2.   
— indicates variable was not entered in this specification.  * = statistically significant at the 10% level; ** = 
statistically significant at the 5% level; *** = statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
 The only characteristics that had strong explanatory power were family status, disability 
status, and being a felon.  All of these factors were barriers to being employed.  The family status 
variable was likely picking up child care responsibilities. 
 
 Table 5.17 provides the coefficient estimates from equation (2’), explaining hourly wages 
as reported by the survey respondents.  These estimates were generated using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), and since the dependent variable was in log form, the coefficients represent 
percentage changes that would accompany a unit change in the variable.  Again, the first column 
of entries displays the results from a specification with a single variable indicating that the 
individual was in the treatment group.  This coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that 
the survey comparison group’s wage rates are about 14 percent higher than treatment group wage 
rates, holding other factors constant.  In the second specification, we replaced the single 
treatment variable with three binary variables—had taken First Step/FAST TRACK only, had 
taken MTI classes, and had taken ITC classes.  All three coefficients are negative, but only the 
coefficient on FS/FT is significant.  Relative to the comparison group, an individual who only 
took First Step/FAST TRACK and didn’t proceed into MTI or ITC has wage rates that are 22 
percent lower.   
 
 The only characteristics that had strong explanatory power were age and being an African 
American.  Both of these had positive impacts on the wage rate.  We hypothesize that the 
positive effects of age, being an African American, being a felon, and being disabled in this 
equation are a result of selection.  The prior equations showed that these characteristics were  
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Table 5.17  Estimates from a Model of Hourly Wage Rates 
Characteristic Specification 1 Specification 2 
Treatment effects 
       Treatment 
       FS/FT only 
       MTI student 
        ITC student 
 
−0.14** 
— 
— 
— 
 
— 
−0.22** 
−0.09 
−0.08 
Demographics 
       Age 
       Male 
       African American 
 
0.01*** 
−0.07 
0.19* 
 
0.01*** 
−0.05 
0.17* 
Preprogram Characteristics 
      Reading test score 
      Math test score 
      Some postsecondary educ. 
 
0.29 
0.00 
0.12 
 
0.02 
0.01 
0.13 
Postprogram Characteristics 
       Poor health 
       Disability 
       Locus of control 
       Felon 
 
−0.02 
0.14 
0.03 
0.10 
 
−0.02 
0.14 
0.02 
0.09 
NOTE: Number of observations = 225.  Models estimated with OLS and include constant and Inverse Mills Ratio 
from first-stage probits. — indicates variable was not entered in this specification.  * = statistically significant at the 
10% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; *** = statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
negatively associated with employment.  The wage equation is estimated only on individuals 
who are employed, so the individuals with these characteristics who are employed must have 
overcome the barriers, and thus, on average, have higher motivation or skills.  
 
 Asset and debt accumulation 
 
 The evaluation survey collected information about asset ownership and debt of the 
respondents.  These are self-reported data, and some of the data seem spurious.  But in general, 
the percentages of individuals that own certain assets and the average values of those assets and 
liabilities seem reasonable.  Table 5.18 presents summary statistics.  The picture that gets painted 
in that table is that a fair share of both the treatment and comparison groups have “mainstream” 
financial assets and liabilities.  There does not seem to be a systematic difference between the 
treatment and comparison group.   
 
 About one-fifth of the respondents indicated that they owned a house, condo, or mobile 
home.  Approximately two-thirds of the homeowners reported owing a balance on it.  About 
two-thirds of the individuals reported owning an automobile, and between one-quarter and one- 
third of them indicated that they owed a balance on it.  A little over half of the respondents 
reported having a checking account, and about 40 percent indicated that they had a savings 
account.   
 
 Between 30 and 40 percent of the respondents (a smaller share of the treatment cases) 
reported owing a balance on a credit card(s).  The average balance was approximately $3,000.  
Finally, about one-fourth of the respondents indicated that they owed money on an educational  
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Table 5.18  Asset and Debts of Treatment and Comparison Group 
Treatment Comparison 
Asset/Liability Have (%) Mean value ($) Have (%) Mean value($) 
Assets     
House, condo, mobile home 20.0 112,957 22.5 127,900 
Automobile 67.1     9,068 65.8     9,797 
2nd automobile 16.8     8,687 14.7   11,630 
Checking account 54.7     1,562 51.1     1,859 
Savings account 39.5     2,217 45.0     4,522 
Liabilities     
House, condo, mobile home 12.3   74,339 14.4   84,717 
Automobile 20.7     8,720 19.9     9,119 
2nd automobile   1.3     4,350   1.5 — 
Credit cards 30.2     2,973 39.8     3,120 
Educational loans 25.5     8,865 28.8   10,475 
Focus: HOPE loan 55.1     6,078 na na 
Child support/alimony   7.4 na   8.1 na 
NOTE:  na means not applicable.  — indicates sample size was too small to calculate mean. 
 
loan with average balances of approximately $9,000.  Finally, 55 percent of the treatment cases 
indicated that they owed money on a Focus: HOPE loan. 
 
 Noneconomic outcomes.  The evaluation survey collected a few items of data that might 
be interpreted as noneconomic outcomes.  In other words, these data may be indicative of the 
individuals’ well-being.  In particular, we examine in Table 5.19 a series of variables that 
comprise a locus of control scale, a self-reported health indicator, and marital status.  The locus 
of control variables are a series questions in which the interviewed individuals respond with a 
scale that goes from 1 to 4 meaning strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree.  The 
items are worded such that a higher score is correlated with a higher degree of self-efficacy and 
self-control.  The health indicator is also a scale, in which the respondent was asked to rate their 
health from 1 to 5 where 1 was poor and 5 was excellent.   
 
Table 5.19  Noneconomic Outcomes 
Outcome 
Treatment group 
(entries are 
mean ratings) 
Comparison group 
(entries are 
mean ratings) 
Locus of control 
I am able to do most things as well as most other people. 
I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
I make long-range plans for myself. 
I generally work towards achieving my goals. 
I can accept criticism about my work. 
I can express disagreement without making other people angry. 
Despite the uncertainties of life, I feel my future is going to be good.
I generally pay my bills on time. 
I am on time for appointments, classes, or meetings. 
 
3.70 
3.73 
3.38 
3.69 
3.57 
3.43 
3.72 
3.25 
3.64 
 
3.67 
3.69 
3.22 
3.63 
3.51 
3.36 
3.67 
3.17 
3.65 
(Self-reported) health condition 4.24 4.15 
Married 15.1% 15.6% 
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 Interestingly, the table shows that the treatment individuals have consistently higher 
“scores” on the locus of control items, and a higher average health status indicator.  In short, 
these data suggest slightly more positive noneconomic outcomes. 
SUMMARY 
 The net impact analysis suggests generally positive labor market outcomes for Focus: 
HOPE students.  Note that the counterfactual that is employed is represented by the comparison 
group of individuals.  In other words, the analysis assumes that if Focus: HOPE were not 
available, then the individuals who attended Focus: HOPE would look like and have outcomes 
like the individuals comprising the comparison group. 
 
 Using wage record data from the State of Michigan, we find that employment rates of 
former students of Focus: HOPE exceed the employment rates of the comparison group for the 
most recent 10 quarters of data.  Furthermore, the same source of data shows that quarterly 
earnings of former students exceed the quarterly earnings of the treatment group for the most 
recent five quarters. 
 
 A less sanguine result from the sample surveys is the relatively modest rate of 
employment that is related to the training received by Focus: HOPE students.  In the first two 
waves of the survey, only about one-third of the employed individuals who had attended Focus: 
HOPE reported working in an industry or job related to machining or IT.  In the third wave, this 
fraction increased to about one-half.  As noted, these data refer to the technical content of the 
training, not the more general employability skills.  Also in interpreting these data, note that the 
job market in Detroit in manufacturing deteriorated substantially over this period of time.  In 
2001, employment in manufacturing in the Detroit MSA was 355,900.  Five years later, it had 
dropped by over 30 percent to 268,000. 
 
 The empirical analyses presented in this chapter shed light on the hypotheses that were 
stated in the introductory chapter.  Specifically, we found the following: 
 
H1: Enrolling in and attending Focus: HOPE programs will result in better 
labor market outcomes. 
 
 This hypothesis was confirmed.  Relative to a comparable group of individuals, 
the students that enrolled in Focus: HOPE programs had employment rates that were on 
the order of 10 percent higher.  Earnings outcomes were not quite as sanguine.  The 
average quarterly earnings of the treatment cases eventually overtook the comparison 
group’s earnings, but not until virtually the end of the analyses time series.  In the 
evaluation survey, we also found that Focus: HOPE students had a higher incidence of 
health insurance coverage, obviously an important component of total compensation.  
Almost two-thirds of the treatment group indicated that they had health insurance 
coverage compared to about one-half for the comparison group in the third wave of the 
survey. 
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H2: Course completers will have better outcomes than individuals who did not 
complete all of their courses. 
 
 This hypothesis was also confirmed.  It took a few quarters for the students 
without incompletes to catch up, but over the last three years, their employment rates 
have exceeded the employment rates of individuals with incomplete classes by 5 to 8 
percentage points, which is greater than 10 percent.  The Focus: HOPE students with 
incompletes also eventually had higher employment rates than the comparison group, but 
the advantage was less than 10 percent.  In terms of average quarterly earnings, Table 5.9 
shows that it took until almost the last couple of quarters for the Focus: HOPE students to 
catch up to the comparison group, and over those quarters, students without any 
incompletes had average quarterly earnings that were between $100 to $300 greater than 
the average for those with an incomplete. 
 
H3: Among MTI and ITC students, individuals who successfully complete a 
sequence of courses will have better outcomes. 
 
 As noted above, we defined a successful MTI completer as an individual who 
completed Core 1 and a successful ITC completer as someone who completed Network 
Administration or Desktop Support.  As Tables 5.5 and 5.10 show, the outcomes for these 
students far exceeded the remaining students and the comparison group. 
 
H4: Holding the number of and completion of courses constant, there should 
be no difference in outcomes between individuals who started in First Step 
or FAST TRACK and those who didn’t. 
 
We have scant, inconclusive evidence on this hypothesis.  The full sample of 
students does not have enough information to support the statistical estimation of a 
regression model that would fully test this hypothesis.  The employment and hourly wage 
models that were estimated from the evaluation survey did not yield statistically 
significant effects regarding program type. 
 
H5: Students who did not progress into a technical program in MTI or ITC, 
i.e., attended only First Step or FAST TRACK, will have poorer 
outcomes, than students who did take machining or IT courses. 
 
 Table 5.3 provides evidence on employment rates.  Students who enrolled in MTI or ITC 
course have much higher employment rates than students who only enrolled in First Step or 
FAST TRACK.  Interestingly, the latter ended up with higher employment rates than the 
comparison group over the last several quarters of data.  This suggests that First Step and FAST 
TRACK are resulting in employability gains even if the students don’t progress into the specific 
machining or IT fields. 
 
 In Table 5.8, we find that MTI and ITC students have much higher average earnings than 
students who did not get beyond First Step or FAST TRACK, although they still barely catch up 
  54
to the comparison group at the end of the data period.  The students in First Step or FAST 
TRACK only remain well behind the comparison group in earnings throughout the entire 
analysis period. 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Focus: HOPE provides valuable training to a population of young individuals who have 
barriers to the development of viable careers such as low-income backgrounds, basic skills 
deficiencies, incarceration in some cases, and single parenthood, in some cases.  As the policy 
and economic times have changed, Focus: HOPE has changed as well.  For students with low 
basic skills, it offered First Step in addition to FAST TRACK.  It initiated training in information 
technology.  Since the late 1990s, Focus: HOPE has operated a loan fund to continue to provide 
access to its programs in the face of declining government support, to provide its students with 
the human capital of dealing with financial responsibility, and to provide revenue for the 
program.   
 
 Obviously, the educational mission of Focus: HOPE is not easy work, and not 
surprisingly this evaluation has found some positives and negatives.  There seems to be little 
doubt that Focus: HOPE is providing valuable training for many students who are becoming 
gainfully employed.  On the other hand, program enrollment and the loan fund’s viability seem 
to be struggling.   
Employment and Earnings 
 The single most positive finding is that Focus: HOPE has a significant impact on the 
employment likelihood of its students.  Comparing all individuals in the treatment group to all 
individuals in the comparison group yields an impact that is on the order of 10 percent (perhaps 
six to seven percentage points), which is comparable to or larger than the impacts found in 
evaluations of many employment training programs.  On average, we estimate that the 
employment rate several quarters after training for the Focus: HOPE students is around 65–70 
percent, whereas it is perhaps 58–63 percent for the comparison group.14   
 
 Disaggregating the employment effect shows that students who progress into the MTI or 
ITC have higher employment likelihoods than students who took only First Step or FAST 
TRACK.  But even First Step or FAST TRACK only students have higher employment rates 
                                                 
14 This 7 percentage point impact can be compared to Raphael and Stoll (2005), who report an estimated 
employment effect of workforce development programs in Massachusetts of 5 percentage points.  Furthermore, 
Hollenbeck and Huang (2006, Table 1.2, p. 8) found the following programmatic impacts on employment in the 
state of Washington: 
  WIA Title I Adults    6.6 percentage points 
  WIA Title I Dislocated Workers   6.4 
  WIA Title I Youth    10.3 
  Community and Technical Colleges  6.7 
  Adult Education     5.9 
  Private Career Schools    4.3 
  Apprenticeships     6.8 
  Secondary Career and Technical Education  5.4 
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than the comparison group.  When we looked at employment outcomes for “successful” 
completers in MTI or ITC, they were even more positive as might be expected. 
 
 Training-related employment rates seem to have improved over time, but still are lower 
than might be expected.  The evidence about training-related placement comes from the 
evaluation survey, and was calculated in two ways.  First, we went through every single record 
that reported an employer and an occupation, and coded whether the occupation was (potentially) 
related to the Focus: HOPE training.  Table 5.15 shows that the training-related employment rate 
for the treatment cases consistently exceeded the rate for the comparison group, but in the first 
two waves the rate for the treatment cases was only about one-third (of the employed 
individuals).  In the third wave, the rate increased significantly to almost 50 percent.  The second 
measure of training-relatedness comes from direct survey questions.  The first question asked of 
students was “Did your training at Focus: HOPE lead to a job?”  In the third wave, 116 out of 
300 respondents (38.7 percent) responded affirmatively.  For those 116 individuals, we asked, 
“Do/did your use your training on this job?”  90 of the 116 (77.6 percent) said yes.  So all 
together, 90 out of 300 (30.0 percent) of the evaluation survey respondents who had been Focus: 
HOPE students said that their training led to a job in which they used their training.   
 
 The earnings impact of Focus: HOPE training is also positive, but it is not nearly as 
strong an effect as employment.  The average quarterly earnings of the treatment group 
eventually surpasses the comparison group, but not until almost the end of the analysis period 
and then only by about $100.  While the earnings impacts are quite modest, we did find some 
evidence in the evaluation survey data that Focus: HOPE students held jobs that were more 
likely to offer health insurance benefits than the comparison group’s jobs.  The fact that the 
earnings impacts are not as sanguine as the employment impacts should not be a surprise.  First, 
the comparison group members were not as likely to have engaged in training during the period 
of time during which the Focus: HOPE students were in training, so they may have gotten job 
experience and their job tenures would be longer implying that their earnings would be higher.   
 
 The second reason why the earnings impacts will not be as positive as the employment 
impacts is somewhat subtle.  It comes down to the fact that because of Focus: HOPE, about 10 
percent more individuals are employed than would be in the absence of Focus: HOPE.  These 
individuals are arguably less employable/less skilled than the rest of the students who got 
employed, so their earnings are likely to bring down the overall average earnings of the group.   
 
 When we disaggregate the treatment group by program completion or by program, we 
find the expected earnings effects.  Completers have much higher average earnings, and MTI and 
ITC students have much higher earnings than individuals who only enrolled in First Step or 
FAST TRACK or the comparison group.  Note that the First Step/FAST TRACK 
enrollees’earnings still ended up similar to the comparison group’s. 
Loan Fund 
 The loan fund has such high default rates as to make it very unlikely that revenue from 
loan payments will ever be enough to supplement government grants, which have been 
dwindling at a precipitous rate, to the point of being viable without substantial subsidization.  
  57
Through 2005, Focus: HOPE has entered into loan contracts since the inception of the loan 
program in 1997–1998 that total approximately $14.8 million.  Through 2005, repayments 
against principal have totaled just over $1.2 million.  Adding late fees, interest, and in-program 
copayments brings this total to about $2.1 million.  Defaults, on the other hand, total about $7.5 
million.   
 
 It is correct to say that the performance of the loan fund has been relatively stable over 
the past three to four years despite a precipitous decline in government grants.   The loan fund 
has an annual net outflow (institutional subsidy) of approximately $2 million that has trended 
downward over the past five years.  Furthermore, the loan fund captures a significant amount of 
fees and interest that may defray a substantial share of the administrative cost of the fund.   
 
 Statistical analyses of repayment data suggest that presence of a cosigner, postprogram 
quarterly earnings, and absence of incomplete courses are most predictive of positive loan 
repayment behavior. 
Enrollments and Completions 
 In the last four years, annual enrollment has trended downward from 1,042 to 830 to 722 
to 559 in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively.  Concomitant with the reduction in 
enrollments over this four-year period has been a reduction in the number of class offerings.  
There were 110 classes in 2002, but this dropped to 76, 73, and 71 in 2003 through 2005.  The 
enrollment drops have occurred in all of the programs.  Enrollment in First Step/FAST TRACK 
averaged 264 students per year; with 357, 281, 247, and 170 in the last four years, respectively.  
The MTI enrollment had been relatively stable, although it dropped significantly in 2005.  Its 
enrollments were 435, 386, 403, and 292, respectively.  That averages 379 students per year.  
The ITC enrollment declined fairly drastically from 2002 to 2004, but then held fairly constant in 
2005.  Its enrollments were 366, 258, 185, and 173, respectively.  That averages 246 students per 
year.   
 
 Course completion rates have also trended downward.  The total number of (beginning) 
students in all of the courses offered was 1,816, 1,385, 1,234, and 965 in the four years, 
respectively.  In 2002, there were 1,146 completions out of the 1,816 students on the rolls (63.1 
percent), and in 2003, the completion rate was 62.1 percent (860 out of 1,385).  In 2004 and 
2005, the rates were 58.6 percent and 58.3 percent, respectively.  The completion rates for First 
Step and FAST TRACK were 83.7, 78.2, 82.2, and 79.4 percent in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, 
respectively.  The ITC and MTI had lower completion rates.  For MTI, the course completion 
rates over the four years were 44.3, 49.5, 47.4, and 49.4 percent.  Finally, the completion rates 
for ITC courses showed a fairly significant downward trend at 73.4, 68.2, 62.1, and 60.0 percent.   
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Of the three major conclusions, the most puzzling is the reduction in enrollments (and 
completions).  It is well-known that training is countercyclical, so Focus: HOPE should be seeing 
a significant increase in enrollment interest given the continuing slump in the Michigan/Detroit 
economy.  The large declines seem inexplicable.  It must be the case that the one or more of the 
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referral mechanisms to Focus: HOPE is not as productive as it was formerly.  We would 
recommend that Focus: HOPE immediately analyze its referral mechanisms and determine what 
would be required to increase them significantly.   
 
 If Focus: HOPE wants to continue its loan fund, there are a few changes that perhaps 
could result in marginal improvements to its financial performance.  Actions that might increase 
the payment rate might include 1) offering educational programs/seminars to current or 
graduating students about debt management, 2) requiring cosigners for a larger share of students, 
and 3) screening out applicants with excessive debt burdens.  Having an incomplete class is a 
strong explanatory factor, so there might be interventions possible when a student quits attending 
or threatens to quit attending a class. 
 
 Given the importance of postprogram earnings for establishing economic independence 
and self-support as well as on loan repayment behavior, it may make sense for Focus: HOPE to 
defer loan repayments until the program completers are employed, and it may be advisable 
Focus: HOPE to “beef up” its placement activities.  This might require more aggressive job 
development, more follow-up to obtain feedback from employers who have hired recent 
graduates, or “radical” innovations such as guaranteed lifetime use of placement services as long 
as students are in good standing with their loan payments. 
 
 Overall, it is accurate to say that the training programs at Focus: HOPE are improving the 
life chances of its students despite encountering over the last few years conditions that might be 
characterized as a perfect storm:  government grants-in-aid have dried up, and the labor market, 
especially in machine trades, has all but evaporated.  These downward trends were unanticipated 
when the loan fund was established.  So in our estimation, the two major problems that Focus: 
HOPE needs to solve in order to continue its positive benefits are establishing stable revenue 
sources to cover the costs of training and to reverse the downward trend in enrollment. 
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APPENDIX:  LOAN FUND SIMULATION 
(MATERIAL FROM YEAR 2 REPORT) 
 
This appendix provides an overview of a simulation model that can be used to analyze 
the financial status of the Focus: HOPE loan fund.  The simulation performed makes many 
simplified assumptions because of data limitations.  Nonetheless, some important features of the 
loan fund are captured.  First, the loan fund is characterized by a high default rate and a 
corresponding low rate of payback that is not isolated to any one particular subgroup of students. 
Default is a ubiquitous phenomenon.  Second, government grants to students are the principle 
source of funds flowing into the loan fund.  Students’ copayments and repayments are small in 
comparison.  Third, interest or late fee income, which would be net inflows to the loan fund, are 
relatively small.  The effect of this combination of a high default rate and a small amount of 
interest and late fee income can be seen in simulation results.  Holding constant the high default 
rate, interest rates would have to be unfeasibly high in order for the loan fund to break even.  
Likewise, holding constant the late fees and interest rate, the default rate would have to be 
lowered to almost zero before the loan fund comes to balance. 
 
The appendix is organized as follows.  We first describe the data sources used for 
information on student repayment and debt and then present results from various policy analysis 
simulations.   
 
Simulation Model Data Sources 
 
 The data for the simulation came mainly from loan payment spreadsheets provided by 
Focus: HOPE, loan payment data from UAS, and the student records Access database from 
Focus: HOPE.  The spreadsheets have been reformatted and entered into an Access database 
where the tables are linked by social security number (SSN).  Because of a substantial number of 
inconsistencies in the SSNs from the different tables, the values used for parameters in the 
simulations are estimates and, thus, likely differ from the true values. 
 
The student records database was the source of data for gender and date of birth.  The 
date of birth was used to calculate age at enrollment.  The AuditClClose files provided 
information on tuition earned, copays, and student responsibility.  These files contained 
information on government payments (defined, in our case, to be any outside payment including 
sources such as employer grants), but it was not formatted in a way that could be easily used.  So 
government payments were defined as the difference between tuition earned and the sum of 
copayments and student responsibility.  The AUDITCNTFLREPAY spreadsheets provided 
information on individuals who were in repayment, who had paid in full, and who were in 
default.  Finally, we used the collections spreadsheets from both Focus: HOPE and UAS to 
calculate how much students had repaid on their loans. 
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Simulation Results 
 
 The simulation tool divides students into five mutually exclusive groups depending on 
whether they took a developmental course (either FAST TRACK or First Step) and then whether 
or not they entered into the information technology (ITC) or machinist career (MTI) track.  Table 
A.1 displays basic data about the five groups: Developmental (did not proceed into ITC or MTI), 
MTI and Developmental, MTI without Developmental, ITC and Developmental, and ITC 
without Developmental.  For each of these groups, the columns in Table A.1 give the average 
tuition earned, student responsibility, grant amount, loan payments received, and delinquency 
rate.  The data in this table come from activated loans only.  In the simulation, someone is 
considered to be in good standing if they have either completely paid off their loan or if they are 
current in their loan payments.  Otherwise they are delinquent. 
 
 The data on debt and repayment in Table A.1 reveal that all individuals in all categories 
have a delinquency rate of around 75 percent.  Furthermore, while average student responsibility 
ranges from a low of about $1,435 to a high of about $6,640, the average amount of loan 
payments received is much lower—from $250 to $650.  To date, grants constitute the largest 
source of revenue for the loan fund. 
 
Table A.1  Loan Fund Overview 
Student group 
Average 
tuition 
earned ($)
Average student 
responsibility ($)
Average 
grant 
amount ($)
Average 
copays ($)
Average 
amount of 
loan 
payments ($) 
Delinquency 
rate (%) 
Developmental (First Step/FT) 1,501  1,435 67 — 255 79.2 
MTI and developmental 6,423  4,038 2,289 97 526 69.0 
MTI, Not developmental 5,431 3,021 2,289 121 433 74.1 
ITC and developmental 8,550 6,638 1,722 191 648 74.8 
ITC, Not developmental 6,662 5,362 1,104 196 527 78.7 
       
Overall average 4,994 3,426 1,466 102 435 75.3 
 
 Table A.2 presents a comparison of the characteristics of individuals who are in 
repayment (repayers) versus those who have been referred to collections or had their debts 
written off (defaulters).  Of all activated loans, 691 students have repaid some or all of their 
loans; 2,104 have made no payments.  Repayers are slightly more likely to be male (67.3 percent 
compared to 65.5 percent) and are, on average, older than nonpayers (an average age of 23.4 
versus 21.8).  Furthermore, in comparing student groups, we find that nonpayers are 
disproportionately concentrated in the developmental only group, whereas both MTI and ITC 
students are disproportionately in the repayer group.   
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Table  A.2  Characteristics of Repayers and Nonpayers 
Group Repayers Nonpayers 
Sample size N=691 N=2,104 
Course/program   
  Percent First Step/FT 22.1 27.7 
  Percent MTI and FS/FT  25.5 18.6 
  Percent MTI w/o FS/FT 31.1 29.2 
  Percent ITC and FS/FT 5.6 5.5 
  Percent ITC w/o FS/FT 15.6 19.0 
Characteristics   
  Percent male 67.3 65.5 
  Average age 23.4 21.8 
 
 Table A.3 contains summary statistics on payments received by enrollment group, age, 
and sex.  Payments are classified as either government (meaning any grant), copays, or repays.  
From a business perspective, Table A.3 allows for the identification of groups with (relatively) 
high revenue.  The highest revenue groups are females in MTI, both those who took the 
developmental courses first and those who didn’t.  These individuals have high levels of grant 
support and repay levels that are comparable to other populations.  The first panel in the table 
shows that students who only took First Step or FAST TRACK had relatively small loans and 
government grants.  Interestingly, repayments on average are not that much different from the 
other groups.  The MTI programs have been in existence longer than the ITC programs, so the 
repayment averages are larger.  Also, the grant payments are greater for MTI, except for males 
who started in a developmental course.  The differences in copay and repay amounts between the 
groups is small in absolute dollar amounts compared to the difference in government funding.  
 
Table  A.3  Payments, by Enrollment Group, Age, and Sex (in dollars) 
Male Female 
Program and age Government Copays Repays Government Copays Repays 
Developmental (FS/FT) only      
17–19   130 — 409 75 — 350 
20–25 33 — 210 46 — 456 
26–64 34 — 153 73 — 264 
MTI and FS/FT       
17–19 2,057 93 1,512 2,830 140 737 
20–25 1,759 80 328 2,934 126 393 
26–64 2,144 94 254 2,761 94 273 
MTI, not FS/FT       
17–19 2,325 135 673 3,631 152 650 
20-25 2,132 120 389 2,853 135 472 
26–64 2,057 106 285 1,929 110 221 
ITC and FS/FT       
17–19 2,064 166 1,162 852 178 426 
20-25 1,544 142 428 675 159 648 
26–64 2,654 225 724 1,827 269 350 
ITC, not FS/FT       
17–19 1,039 179 393 1,188 155 320 
20–25 649 212 218 735 204 449 
26–64 781 198 284 1,642 219 185 
NOTE:  Data based on activated loans only.
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Simulation model operation 
 
 The section describes a simulated model of the loan fund built into an Excel spreadsheet. 
The simulation parameters, provided in Table A.4, are based on actual historical data from 
activated loans.  The simulation model allows these parameters to be varied to accomplish 
sensitivity analyses such as the following: 
 
• enrollment of students into various mutually exclusive groups (developmental 
(FS/FT) only, MTI and FS/FT, MTI without developmental, ITC and FS/FT, ITC 
without developmental); 
• amount of copayments required; 
• loan interest rates; 
• percentage of students who never make any payment into the system; 
• quarterly percentage of students who become late in their payments after making a 
payment in the previous quarter; 
• quarterly percentage of students who default after becoming delinquent; and 
• quarterly percentage of students who pay their debts in full. 
 
The accounting period of the simulation model is quarterly.  
 
Table A.4  Simulation Parameters 
Parameter 
ITC, with  
FS/FT 
ITC  
only 
MTI, with 
FS/FT 
MTI  
only 
FS/FT   
only 
Quarterly enrollment of students 10 35 20 75 40 
Tuition 7,808 6,150 6,613 5,241 1,365 
Total copays 187 198 108 125 0 
Percent government payments 28.5 26.8 47.7 57.7 19.4 
Percent who never make a payment (default) 65.2 76.9 67.6 70.4 69.8 
Percent quarterly who become late 37.1 40.6 36.5 38.4 41.3 
Percent quarterly of late who default 33.6 40 30.9 35.6 34.3 
Percent quarterly pay in full 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Net fund outflow ($401,637) 
Assumptions: Years to pay off loan: 5 
  Interest rate: 5% 
  Total quarters: 20 
  Late fee $15 
 
 The key outcome of the simulation model is net fund outflow.  The net fund outflow is 
defined as the flow of quarterly expenses (new tuition liabilities minus government grants, which 
equal new loans made) subtracted from the flow of quarterly revenues (repays and copays). 
 
For simplicity, the simulation model assumes all persons in a particular programmatic 
category have the same characteristics (this is a simplifying assumption that may be relaxed in 
future work).  It is furthermore assumed that all students complete all of their courses in a single 
quarter, and that Focus: HOPE receives copayments and any applicable government grants 
during that quarter.  After they attend classes and incur a loan in the first quarter, students enter 
one of three “states” in the second quarter.  Theses states are called repayment, paid in full, and 
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default.  Default means that the student will not make any more loan payments in this or 
successive quarters (referred to as a sinking state in Markov chains.)  The small share of students 
who pay off their loan in full also never reenter the simulation (another sinking state).  Once in 
repayment a student can stay in repayment, pay off the balance of the loan, or become late in 
paying in the third and successive quarters.  Students who are late in paying go into default or go 
back into repayment.  If a student who was late goes back into repayment, a late fee is added to 
the regular loan payment.  Figure A.1 presents a flow chart of the simulation model.   
 
In the simulation in quarter 1, there is only 1 cohort.  In quarter 2, there are 2 cohorts; 
cohort 1 in the first quarter of repayment or default and cohort 2 in the taking classes phase.  As 
the quarters progress, additional cohorts are added.  After the number of quarters reaches the 
time allotted for cohort 1 to pay off its loans, the model enters a steady state, meaning the 
inflows and outflows will not change from quarter to quarter as the new cohort is offset by the 
leaving cohort. For example, if the time allotted to pay off the loan is 5 years the model enters 
steady state after 20 (5 × 4 = 20) quarters. 
 
 
The default parameters used in the baseline case for the simulation are based on estimates 
generated from data provided by Focus: HOPE.  Table A.4 shows the numbers used to generate 
the baseline case.  The first row gives the quarterly number of students in each category, the 
        Figure A.1  Simulation Model Flowchart 
New StudentsTake Classes 
Quarter 1 
Repayment Paid Off Default Repayment 
Quarter 2 
Repayment Paid Off LateRepayment  
Quarter 3 
Repayment Paid Off Late Default Repayment  
Quarter 4 
Late
Default 
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second row gives tuition amounts, and the third row gives the percentage of tuition covered by 
government grants.  The total number of students is assumed to be 180 in a quarter (or 720 per 
year).  The fourth and fifth rows give the percentages of students each quarter who either (at 
onset) never make a payment to Focus: HOPE or, having made a payment in the past, the 
probability that they will fail to make a payment in the next quarter.  Keep in mind that this is a 
quarterly default rate and that defaults will compound over the term of the loan.  The sixth row 
gives the probability that the failure to make one payment will be followed by the failure to make 
any future payments.  The last row gives the percentage of students who pay their debts in full 
each quarter.  Net fund outflows in the baseline case are −$401,637 per quarter.  On an annual 
basis, this is about $1.6 million, which is in line with Table 3.3 data. 
 
Results of simulation experiments 
 
 A question of concern to Focus: HOPE is how to reduce the net fund outflow.  The first 
experiment that we did was to, in effect, invest more resources into delinquent (i.e., late) cases 
and reduce the rate at which delinquent cases end up in default.  We simulate the effect on net 
fund outflows of changing the quarterly default rate from its baseline of around 35 to 40 percent 
to 20, 10, and 0 percent.  The results are given in Table A.5.  These changes reduce the net fund 
outflow by up to $70,000 per quarter, or about 18 percent of the outflow.  Of course, the cost of 
getting all delinquent cases to begin repayment may be quite high. 
 
Table A.5  Effect of Changing Default Rate of Those Who Become Late 
Percent quarterly who become late Net fund outflow ($) 
Baseline (approx. 35–40) (401,637) 
20 (380,243) 
10 (360,867) 
0 (330,677) 
 
 The next experiment that was performed was to simulate the effect of investing the 
resources to reduce the default rate of student.  That is, about 70 percent of loan holders never 
make any payments.  Through education programs, better screening of applicants, or requiring 
more cosigners, it might be possible to reduce that percentage.  Table A.6 shows the results of 
changing the percentage of students who never make a payment from baseline (approximately 70 
percent) to 50, 25, and 0 percent.  These changes have a larger impact on the net outflow than 
reducing delinquencies.  Note that the baseline parameters of the rate of default for delinquencies 
are held constant at their baseline values (about 35 to 40 percent).  Getting the percentage of 
initial defaults down to 25 percent for example, reduces the net fund outflow by almost 25 
percent, from −$401,637 to −$300,818.   
 
Table A.6  Effect of Changing Percent Who Never Make a Payment  
Percent who never make a payment Net fund outflow ($) 
Baseline (approx. 65–70) (401,637) 
50 (355,503) 
25 (300,818) 
0 (246,120) 
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 Another mechanism for reducing the net fund outflow would be to institute copayments 
in the developmental First Step and FAST TRACK programs and to increase the copayments for 
MTI and ITC.  Table A.7 displays the results of changing the baseline copay structure to 1) a 
moderate increase of an average of $300 for MTI and ITC and $150 for FS/FT, and 2) a more 
substantial increase of an average of $600 for MTI and ITC and $250 for FS/FT.  This change 
does not affect the bottom line much.  The biggest change reduces the outflow by about $60,000 
per quarter (15 percent).   
 
Table A.7  Effect of Changing Copays 
Copay amounts Net fund outflow ($) 
Baseline copay structure (401,637) 
$300 average from ITC and MTI and 
$150 average from FS/FT only  
 
(378,213) 
$600 average from ITC and MTI and 
$250 average from FS/FT only 
 
(339,096) 
 
 Table A.8 simulates the effect of a change in interest rates while holding constant the 
current default rate and copay structure.  The results indicate that even if raising the interest rate 
had no effect on the default rate (a strong assumption), the loan fund would not have a positive 
net fund outflow unless it charges an astronomical 242 percent interest rate. 
 
Table A.8  Effect of Changing Interest 
Interest rate on loan Net fund outflow ($) 
  
Baseline (5%) (401,637) 
 18% (386,147) 
 50% (339,941) 
  
 242% 1,519 
 
 In short, the simulation model suggests that the most payoff may come from policies or 
procedural changes that induce more students to begin to payoff their loan.  Smaller impacts 
come from reducing the default rate of delinquent accounts, increasing the copay structure, or 
raising the interest rate charged on loans.  Of course, a combination of these types of changes 
might yield significant impacts. 
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